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INTRODUCTION
Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall coined the term in Brown v.
Mmyland in 1827, the police power has been a pivot of American
constitutional thinking. As recently as 1991 the Supreme Court
spoke in Barnes v. Glen Theatre of "[t] he traditional police power of
the States" as one which "we have upheld [as] a basis for legislation";
this plurality opinion of the Court defined it as "the authority to
provide for the public health, safety, and morals."2 True, in recent
times the police power has been under pressure, and the
jurisprudence associated with it manifests tensions of several kinds.
First, tension results from the contemporary emphasis on
constitutional rights, as these are normally seen as, to one degree or
another, a trump which the police power cannot easily override. The
expansion of the recognition of rights, the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states, and the subsequent purported constraint of the
police power will not, however, be discussed in any detail within this
Article-although indisputably they involve questions of interest and
importance. Second, a particular field of police power activity has
been under fire in the last few decades, namely the promotion of
public morals or public morality. It has even been argued by one
current Supreme Court Justice that the Court's decision in Lawrence
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v. Texas3 effectively means that the police power regarding public
morality is being eliminated . Although the topic undoubtedly calls
for attention, the implications of Lawrence v. Texas and of other cases
in which provisions of morals legislation were struck down are outside
the object of the present inquiry. Third, it is clear that modern
constitutional scholarship, with its characteristic preference for
rights, pays less attention to the police power than was the case in
earlier times. A cursory glance at the tables of contents of the most
authoritative constitutional law treatises and case books reveals the
near absence of the entry "police power,"5 which stands in stark
contrast to the extensive treatment of the topic by earlier
constitutional scholars.6 Again, this Article will not consider the
reasons for what seems to be a trend away from the study of the
police power.
In summary, there are indeed question marks over the future of
the police power, but I will not reflect upon the potential
uncertainties that they raise, nor will I consider in a systematic way
whether American constitutional law could be better conceptualized
without the category of the police power. Rather, taking as its
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute making homosexual sodomy a crime,
which had been applied to consenting adults acting in private, and overruling Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
4 See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of
these laws is called into question by today's decision... .") (emphasis added). Even assuming that
Justice Scalia was right it would still be possible to maintain that some of the conduct he men-
tions could be regulated on grounds other than moral disapprobation. For example, Justice
Souter has argued that the constitutionality of a statute banning public nudity should be ana-
lyzed in light of the detrimental secondary effects of that conduct. See City of Erie v. Pap's, 529
U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barnes, 501 U.S. at
582 (Souter,J., concurring in the judgment); see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 282, 291 (accepting
Justice Souter's secondary effects test in a plurality opinion). A similar point has been made by
the editors of the Harvard Law Review with respect to other forms of conduct described by jus-
tice Scalia, such as adultery and incest: "legitimate state interests other than moral disapproba-
tion may justify regulating [them]." The Supreme Court, 2002 Term--Leading Cases: Constitutional
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 303 n.62 (2003). The possibility of separating morality from other
considerations, which underlies this kind of argument, is not considered in this Article.
E.g., GILBERT GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997);
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2000); GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter I TRIBE]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). For occasional references to the police power, see
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra, at 162-63, 459; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 310-12, 401-02;
STONE ETAL., supra, at 1635-36, 1660; 1 TRIBE, supra, at 1046, 1342, 1348.
6 The two most complete works on the police power date from the early twentieth century.
They are Ernst Freund's magisterial treatise, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Arno Press 1976) (1904), and W. G. Hastings's thorough and lengthy
essay, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State, 39
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 359 (1900). Nothing of the sort has been written since then.
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starting point the classical understanding of the police power as
illustrated for instance in Brown v. Maryland and Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, this Article will trace the historical background of this key
notion of American constitutional law.7 Even if it were to be argued
that because of the aforementioned tensions the police power is no
longer a cornerstone of American constitutional law,8 this enterprise
would still be worthwhile. On the one hand, the understanding of
the historical origins of a legal institution is always of interest for its
own sake insofar as it illuminates the past; on the other, it can
reasonably be expected that that understanding will shed light on the
status quo, whatever it may be.
The police power suffers from a surprising problem. Though it
has been in constant use for many years and has proved important in
the vocabulary of American constitutional law9 (indeed, it has been
said to be "one of the most important concepts in American
constitutional history" 0), it is, or stands for, one of the most
misunderstood ideas in constitutional law." The meaning and
implications of the term are far from clear; hence Thayer's oft-quoted
remark made as long ago as 1895: "[d]iscussions of what is called the
'police power' are often uninstructive .... It is my hope that, by
inquiring into the historical origins of the police power, this Article
will help to clarify the meaning of the phrase.
Where does the term "police power" come from? How and why
was it incorporated into American constitutional law? What does it
mean? These are the questions that I will address. It will become
clear that in its broad, original meaning, which can be traced to the
concept of internal police, the police power is a constitutive principle
of American federalism. It will become clear too that American
federalism cannot be fully understood without reference to the police
power, for, as will be shown, "police power" was the name Americans
' The concept of police power has been imported from American constitutional practice by
countries which, like Argentina, drew inspiration from the American Constitution when draft-
ing their own constitutions.
8 Contra David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 501 (2004) ("[The police power] is a concept at
the center of profound developments in the American law.").
9 FREUND, supra note 6, at iii.
'0 Harry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1744, 1744 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
n See 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136
(1893) ("[T]he police power.., is the 'dark continent' of our jurisprudence. It is the conven-
ient repository of everything for which our juristic classifications can find no other place.");
Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322, 322 (1907) (stating that
"[n]o phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less understood" than the police
power).
I2 1JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693 n. 1 (1895).
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chose in order to designate the whole range of legislative power not
delegated to the federal government and thus retained by the states.'3
That broad notion, it will be argued, is at the root of what seems
today an unexplained head of power, namely the narrower concept
of police power as the promotion of public health, safety, and morals.
My inquiry will conform to the following structure: Section I will
deal with the formation of the idea of "police" in the writings of
Vattel, Blackstone, and other eighteenth-century European thinkers.
One of the most important findings of this research is that the early
notions of police, or those associated with the term "police," are of
particular relevance for the later development of the police power.
Section II will analyze the meaning and scope of the concept of
"police," one of the more slippery terms in the English language. 4
Section III will consider the origin of the formative analogy between
king and father and briefly sketch its philosophical underpinnings.
The analogy, it will be argued, provided the context for the original
theorizing about police (in the relevant sense of "police"). By means
of a survey of the relevant portions of early American constitutional
history, Section IV will show how the concept of "police" was adopted
in the United States. Exploring the meaning that the word "police"
had in eighteenth-century North America will help us to understand
the use of the term in documents and court decisions of that time.
Section V will explain the transformation of police into what we know
as "the police power." Since it was mainly the courts that brought
about this transformation, the pertinent early cases will be analyzed.
Section VI will advance the idea, already hinted at, that there are
broad and narrow definitions of police power remaining in American
constitutional law, especially in the case law of the Supreme Court.
Each definition will be studied here. For the purposes of the cases to
be considered in Sections V and VI, a cut-off date will be established
in the early twentieth century, with the rise of the so-called Lochner
era, although I will make incidental references to some post-Lochner
decisions.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF POLICE
The term "police" originally meant something other than law
enforcement. It is instructive to look at its etymology first. "Police"-
and its cognates "policy" and "polity"-come from the Latin poitTa,
which itself is a descendant of the Greek word politeia and, ultimately,
" Compare with the legislative power of British colonies, which, it seems, does not have a
name. See infra note 139.
" "Police" is a slippery term in other languages, too. See infra notes 22, 94.
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of polis."5  Potl-ta meant civil administration or government, and,
according to Peirce and Cook, "It]he Romans conceived the
word... as meaning the condition of the State."' 6 Ayto explains that
in Medieval Latin a variant politia emerged, which became the French
term "police" that was to be taken over by English.
7
From the sixteenth century onwards "police" was used in English
as a synonym of "policy," in the sense of commonwealth or organized
state. It also signified civil organization and civilization."' These
meanings, however, became obsolete in the nineteenth century.' 9 By
the early eighteenth century "police" started to denote what pofft-a
meant in Suarez's late Latin, namely the regulation, discipline, and
control of a community; civil administration and public order.20 This
use had prevailed even earlier in the European continent, especially
in France2' and Spain.22 It was also to be found in Scotland where
'5 WALTER W. SKEAT, ETYMOLOGYCAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 461-62 (new
ed. rev. and enlarged 1935). The same is true of other romance languages, such as Spanish. See
4 JOAN COROMINAS & Jost A. PASCUAL, DICCIONARIO CRiTICO ETIMOL6GICO CASTELLANO E
HISPAkNICO 548 (1981).
16 j. LEONARD PEIRCE & HARRY CLAYTON COOK, MANUAL TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 52 (1938). In the seventeenth century the Spanish theologian
Francisco Suarez used the term "politia" in his De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore as a synonym for the
Latin terms regimen and gubernatio. The three words were used to connote human government
and civil administration. See, e.g., 3 FRANCISCO SuAREz, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE 145
(1975) ("Unde necesse est ut vel sentiat finem canonici iuris esse tantum externam politiam
humanam, quod valde absurdum est, vel oportet ut sentiat finem iuris civilis non sistere in hu-
mana politia et externa pace ac iustitia reipublicae, sed etiam tendere ad veram felicitatem hu-
manam.") (emphasis added) ("Therefore [Fortunio Garcfa de Ercilla] must hold that the end
of canon law consists solely in external human government, which is quite absurd, or that the
end of civil law is not just that order of human government, external peace and justice of the
state, but also pursuing the true human felicity.").
" JOHN AYrO, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 402 (1990); see CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF
ETYMOLOGY 812-13 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988) ("The English form police in the modern
sense of law enforcement was borrowed from modern French police, but in its older sense of civil
organization was borrowed from Old French policie.").
"S These now obsolete senses of police were not differentiated from earlier use in the form
policie in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra
note 17, at 812-13.
9 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989).
'o Id.
2 Id.; see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 44 (1993) (citing Claude Sayssel's early-sixteenth-century use of the term la Police to
refer to one of the restraints on royal power in France); M. Raeff, The Well Ordered Police State
and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe, 80 AM. HIST. REV.
1221, 1235 (1975) (noting the emergence of the concept of police in eighteenth-century
France heralded by Nicolas de LaMare's treatise TRAITI DE POLICE, first published in 1722).
2 In the fourteenth century the Spanish term "policia" meant politics. 4 COROMINAS &
PASCUAL, supra note 15, at 548. The Spanish Dictionary of Authorities of 1737 records a differ-
ent meaning: "the good order that ought to be preserved in the cities and republics through
the observance of the laws and ordinances established for their good government." 5 REAL
ACADEMIA ESPAfqOLA, DICCIONARIO DE AUTORIDADES 311 (photo. reprint 1976) (1737) (trans-
lated from Spanish). This sense of policia is similar to Vattel's "police." See infra text accompa-
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
"Commissioners of Police," for the general internal administration of
the country, were appointed by Queen Anne in 1714. This was
apparently the first official use of the word in Great Britain.3
Scotland, in fact, had a lot to do with the development of the idea
of police in the British Isles. Standard modern reference works on
Scottish laws and institutions take it for granted that "police" always
referred to municipal police forces,24 but this is not the case. In
eighteenth-century Scotland "police" had a very different meaning.
The term appeared as a heading of miscellaneous regulations and in
the context of a class of crimes, namely "offences against the police."
In Statute Law of Scotland, published in 1757, Lord Kames included a
category of laws called "police" which comprised a whole variety of
regulations. The following are but a few examples:
That ladders, and other instruments to extinguish fire, be kept in every
burgh .... That common women be put at the utmost ends of the town,
where least danger of fire is; and that none set them houses in the heart
of the town .... That none be found in taverns after nine at night .... 15
Most of the other regulations included by Lord Kames under the
heading of police are of an economic type.2 6 These economic rules,
together with the non-economic ones mentioned above, instantiate
an emerging pattern in the conceptualization of police that is
recognizable in the elaborations of eighteenth-century writers like
Vattel and Blackstone. 7
The category of "offences against the police" was apparently used
for the first time in Scotland in John Erskine's An Institute of the Law of
Scotland, published posthumously in 1773.28 It was not present in
nying note 57. The aforementioned dictionary adds that policia also meant cleanliness. For
more on this meaning, see infra text accompanying note 41.
23 CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 17, at 812-13; 12 OxFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 23; 3 LEON RADZINOWICz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 1 (1948). For the idea of "police" in the Scottish
Enlightenment, see W.G. Carson, Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing 1795-
1900 (pt. 1), 17 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z.J. CRIMINOLOGY 207, 209-10 (1984).
24 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 376 (1931); 16 THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND:
STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 233 (1995).
LORD HENRY H. KAMES, STATUTE LAW OF SCOTLAND ABRIDGED: WITH HISTORICAL NOTES
271 (1757).
See id. at 270, 274 ("To avoid dearth of corn, those who have not 1000 merks yearly of free
rent prohibited to keep their horses at hard meat .... For the encouragement of the linen
manufactures of this kingdom, enacted, That no corpse of any person whatever shall be buried
in any shirt, sheet, or any thing else, except in plain linen, made and spun within this king-
dom .... "). This economic dimension of police is also illustrated in the title of a book by
PATRICK LINDESAY, THE INTEREST OF SCOTLAND CONSIDERED, WITH REGARD TO ITS POLICE, IN
IMPLOYING OF THE POOR, ITS AGRICULTURE, ITS TRADE, ITS MANUFACTURES, AND FISHERIES
(1733).
27 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
21 JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 116, at 705 (Edinburgh, J. Bell
1773). Probably on the correct assumption that An Institute of the Law of Scotland was based on
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either Erskine's previous work, Principles of the Law of Scotland (1754),
or in George Mackenzie's Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1684).
The latter is especially noteworthy as Erskine followed Mackenzie's
order in his own Institute.
According to Erskine, crimes can be broadly divided into three
categories. "Certain crimes are committed more immediately against
God himself, others against the state, or the public peace, and a third
sort against particular persons."2 9 Offenses "against the laws enacted
for the police or good government of a country" belong to the
second class .3 "Police" is here equated to "good government." As to
these laws, Erskine explains:
The chief of those laws are calculated for the providing all the members
of the community with a sufficient quantity of the necessaries of life at
reasonable rates, and for the preventing of dearth.... This crime was
committed, either by landholders who refused to sell the produce of
their land at ajust price; or by merchants who bought up great quantities
of corn, in the view of again selling it at a higher price, when the crop
should be more scanty.
In Scottish law this crime was known as "forestalling," and with that
name it had previously appeared in Mackenzie's Institutions,32 but it
was not there included in a category of offenses against the police as
it would be in Erskine's Institute.
Immediately after explaining the crime of forestalling, Erskine
expounds the laws "restraining idleness, and punishing sturdy
beggars and vagabonds. 33 Although he does not expressly say so, it is
safe to take these to also be instances of laws enacted for the police or
good government of the country. As indicated below, 34 Blackstone
likewise counted idleness and vagrancy as offenses against the public
police.
Finally, Erskine affirms that "[t]here are many slighter offences
against the penal laws, relating to the peace of the country,
which ... [are] rather trespasses than crimes. "35 Among these, he
includes offenses against the laws preserving the game, another
earlier notes of Erskine's lectures, the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term "police"
had been used by him not later than 1768, while Blackstone was finishing his Commentaries. 12
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 22 (meaning 3.a).
9 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 116, at 705.
'o Id. 138, at 714.
31 Id.
32 SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 223 (4th ed., Edin-
burgh,J. Watson 1706).
13 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 39, at 714.
See infra text accompanying note 89.
15 ERSKINE, supra note 28, 39, at 715 (discussing crimes of a less severe nature).
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typical example of what Blackstone will call offences against the
public police.
Adam Smith also contributed to the Scottish development of the
idea of police with a definition that was slightly different from the
ones we have seen. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, delivered at the
University of Glasgow between 1762 and 1764, 37 Smith confirms the
French origin of the term: "[t]he name [police] is French, and is
originally derived from the Greek iro3ireta [politeia], which properly
signified the policey of civil government. .. ." Jurisprudence-"the
theory of the general principles of law and government"3g-has four
great objects or divisions, one of which is Police, the others being
Justice, Revenue, and Arms.40
According to Smith, police no longer carried the Greek meaning:
"now it only means the regulation of the inferiour parts of
government, viz. cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty.
4
1
The latter "inferiour part" considers "the most proper way of
procuring wealth and abundance, 42 or, in other words, "the opulence
of a state., 43  For when internal peace is secured-thanks to the
respect for justice, the first end of every system of government 4 -"the
government will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the
state. This produces what we call police. Whatever regulations are
made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures
of the country are considered as belonging to the police."45 Smith
attributed considerable importance to this economic meaning of
i rr r of6police, intertwined in "the inferiour parts of government; a
meaning that we have already observed in contemporary Scottish
jurisprudence.47 It should be noted, however, that it has become
" See infra text accompanying note 89.
The edited manuscript of the lectures was published for the first time in 1896 by Edwin
Cannan. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., Clarendon
Press 1978) (1896).
Id. at 486.
Id. at 398.
Id.
" Id. at 486.
" Id. at 487.
Id. at 398.
4 Id.
" I d. at 5 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 486.
,7 KAMES, supra note 25, at 269-77; supra text accompanying note 26. These references to
economic police regulations show that Crosskey is wrong when he contends that Adam Smith's
use of the term "police" is not to be found in that of any other writer. See WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1303 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1953); see also infra note 95 (quoting Lieber's definition of "police," which includes refer-
ence to the role of maintaining "cleanliness").
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obsolete."
Before analyzing Blackstone's contribution, let us focus on the
work of a continental writer who wrote a few years before the
Commentaries on the Laws of England was published. In 1758, the Swiss
jurist Emmerich de Vattel published his Le Droit des Gens.49 Although
the author confessed in the Preface that his treatise was not an
original work but a popularization of Christian Wolff s philosophical
Jus Gentium,50 Vattel's book "made a profound impression upon the
mind of the time; and especially, upon the mind of America."'" This
was made possible by an English translation of the book appearing
the year after the original publication in French. 52
For Vattel the sovereign ought to watch over the nation "as a
tender and wise father, and as a faithful administrator.- 3  Insofar as
he is a father, the sovereign ought to procure the true felicity of the
48 See 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 22 (meaning 3.b) ("In commercial
legislation, Public regulation or control of a trade; an economic policy. Obs."). The dictionary
quotes Smith's "Police of Grain" for the earliest example of "police" being used in that sense. See
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS, Ch. XI, III
(1776).
49 See generally EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOi NATURELLE,
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (1749-1750), re-
printed in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916).
See C. G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel (pts. 1 & 2), 7 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 395 (1913), 8 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 375 (1914) (evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of LE DROIT DES GENS).
"' CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 147. Crosskey adds, moreover, that: "In consequence of
this.... [Vattel's book] was constantly cited by the politicians of our formative period; by the
lawyers of the day; and by pamphleteers and newspaper essayists, of every shade of opinion and
description." Id. Fenwick makes a similar point:
A century ago not even the name of Grotius himself was more potent in its influence
upon questions relating to international law than that of Vattel. Vattel's treatise on the
law of nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in speeches before legislative assemblies,
and in the decrees and correspondence of executive officials. It was the manual of the
student, the reference work of the statesman, and the text from which the political phi-
losopher drew inspiration. Publicists considered it sufficient to cite the authority of Vat-
tel to justify and give conclusiveness and force to statements as to the proper conduct of
a state in its international relations.
Fenwick, supra note 50, at 395. A significant example of the point made by Crosskey and Fen-
wick is the oral argument in the famous case Gibbons v. Ogden. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 85 n.29
(1824) (citing to Vattel for authority on the potential for sovereign states to unite and still
maintain their independence). There are further illustrations of Vattel's authority in American
legal history. See Fenwick, supra note 50, at 407 (noting other American references to Vattel);
see alsoJ. M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 299-300 (1992) (illustrating
how Vattel's work "developed enormous authority in the later eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies . . ").
52 See generally EMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE,
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NA_
TIONS] (London, Newbery et al. 1759-60) (Vol. 111759) (Vol. I 1760).
53 1 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 42, at 21. In another passage, while dealing with private property and
its limitations, he reiterates this idea of the sovereign as father: "as the father of his people,
[he] may, and ought to set bounds to a prodigal, and to prevent his running to ruin .... " I Id.
bk. I, ch. XX, § 254, at 104.
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nation, which is one of the principal objects of a good government.
To name this object of government Vattel uses the French word police,
which was translated as "polity" in the first English edition.54 Some
later English editions, however, chose the term "police" instead of
"polity."5 At any rate, these two words are cognates and were used
interchangeably in the eighteenth century.56 What does "polity" or
"police" mean for Vattel?
Polity consists in the attention of the prince and magistrates to preserve
everything in order. Wise regulations ought to prescribe whatever will
best contribute to the public safety, utility and convenience, and those who
have the authority in their hands, cannot be too attentive to their being
observed. By a wise polity, the sovereign accustoms the people to order and
obedience, and preserves peace, tranquility and concord among the citi-
57
zens ....
This may well be the d6but of the English term "polity" or "police"
in a treatise of political theory.8 Vattel elaborates on the term
"police" by giving various examples of regulations. First, he gives the
example of the prohibition on duelling, 9 which would become
commonplace amongst police norms. Secondly, he mentions the
rules that the sovereign, as a good father, ought to lay down to
prevent the economic ruin of his "prodigal" sons. 60  These too are
police regulations. Finally, Vattel adds further examples in the
context of the limits of private property:
It must also be observed, that individuals are not free in the oeconomy or
government of their affairs as not to be subject to the regulations of polity,
made by the sovereign. For instance, if vines are greatly multiplied in a
country, which is in want of corn, the sovereign may forbid the planting
of the vine in fields proper for tillage, for here the public welfare and the
safety of the state are concerned. When a reason of such importance re-
quires it, the sovereign, or the magistrate, may oblige an individual to sell
An anonymous translation of the 1793 edition also uses the term 'polity' for the French
police. For a complete bibliography of the different editions of Vattel's book in different lan-
guages, see VATrEL, THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 49, at Ivi-lix.
See EMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE,
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS] bk. I, ch. XIII, § 174, at 82 (Joseph Chitty trans., Sweet et al. eds., 1834) (using the term
"internal police" instead of "polity"); id. bk. I, ch. XX, § 255, at 115 (referring to "regulations of
police" instead of "regulations of polity").
See CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 149 (noting the parallel meaning of "polity" and "police").
57 1 VAT-EL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 174, at 76-77 (emphasis added).
m By way of contrast, Grotius had not touched upon the topic of police. See generally HUGO
GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES [Of the Law of War and Peace, in Three Books]
(photo. reprint 1984) (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625).
59 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 175, at 77 ("A duel.., is a manifest disorder
contrary to the welfare of Society.").
60 Id. bk. I, ch. XX, § 254, at 104; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (analogizing the
sovereign to a father figure).
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all the provisions that are more than sufficient for the subsistence of his
family, and fix the price. The public authority may and ought to hinder
monopolies, and suppress all practices tending to raise the price of provi-
61sions ....
We finally turn to England, where the French idea of police was
regarded with disfavour. This was clearly witnessed, for example, by a
letter signed by Tom Tipsey and published in the British Magazine in
October 1763 with the tide, "Some droll Remarks on fashionable Words":
The word police has made many bold attempts to get a footing. I have
seen it more than once strongly recommended in the papers; but as nei-
ther the word nor thing itself are much understood in London, I fancy it
will require a considerable time to bring it into fashion; perhaps, from an
aversion to the French, from whom this Word is borrowed; and some-
thing, under the name of police, being already established in Scotland,
English prejudice will not soon be reconciled to it.62
Indeed, for some years the term "police" was only used by the
English to make reference to the police of the French and other
European nations.63 It fell to Sir William Blackstone to establish the
idea of "police" in English jurisprudence.
A contemporary of Vattel, Blackstone had read the work of
European authors such as Samuel Pufendorf, whom he cites on
several occasions.64 Pufendorf had sown the seeds of the concept of
'" 1 VATrEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XX, § 255, at 104 (emphasis added). Chitty's edition of
1834 reads: "It must also be observed, that individuals are not so perfectly free in the economy
or government of their affairs, as not to be subject to the laws and regulations of police made by
the sovereign." VATTEL, supra note 55, bk. I, ch. XX, § 255, at 115 (emphasis added).
6' THE BRITISH MAGAZINE OR MONTHLY REPOSITORY FOR GENTLEMEN & LADIES 542 (1763).
Along similar lines, Radzinowicz affirms that "[w] hen the word 'police' was first introduced into
England in the early part of the eighteenth century it was regarded with the utmost suspicion as
a portent of the sinister force which held France in its grip." 3 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 23, at
1. This notable historian of English law then reproduces the following amusing and illuminat-
ing passage from a letter written from Scotland around 1720:
I am tempted (by way of Chat) to make Mention likewise of a Frenchman, who under-
stood little English. Soon after his Arrival in London, he had observed a good deal of Dirt
and Disorder in the Streets, and asking about the Police, but finding none that under-
stood the Term, he cried out, "Good Lord! how can one expect Order among these
People, who have not such a Word as Police in their Language.
Id.
, The Oxford English Dictionary illustrates well this point by quoting Swift, "Nothing is held
more commendable in all great cities.., than what the French call the police, by which word is
meant the government thereof," (1732) and Keysler, "Their police is very commendable, and
great attention is shewn in suppressing luxury, superfluous magnificence, and ... dissipations"
(1760). 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 22 (meaning 3.a). Furthermore,
Chesterfield is reported to have written in 1756 that "[w]e are accused by the French ... of hav-
ing no word in our language, which answers to their word police, which therefore we have been
obliged to adopt, not having, as they say, the thing." Id.
64 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *43, *101; 4 id. at *7, *31.
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police in his book, The Law of Nature and Nations.65 Writing in 1672,
he asked himself what the power of the prince was "[i]n
Commonwealths... where the Properties of the Subjects do not
originally depend upon the Government." His answer: "the civil
Sovereign hath no further Power over them than what immediately
flows from the Nature of the Supreme Power in itself, unless the
Subjects freely consent to enlarge it."67 What is, then, the natural
extent of this power? Without using the word "police," Pufendorf
nevertheless addresses the concept:
But now this Power we are here speaking of, may, I think, be reduc'd to
three Heads: First, to the Right of making Laws to direct such a Propor-
tion in the Use and Consumption of certain Goods and Commodities, as
the State of the Commonwealth requires. Secondly, to the Right of levy-
ing Taxes. Thirdly, to the Exercise of the Transcendental Propriety. To
the first Head we may reduce all Sumptuary Laws, or such as prescribe
Bounds to extravagant unnecessary Expenses, which would, in Course of
Time, be the Ruin of private Families, and, in Consequence, weaken the
Commonwealth itself, by carrying the publick Money abroad into foreign
Countries; whither the Humour or Vanity of Luxury and Waste generally
runs. Besides, another Inconvenience to be prevented by such Laws is
this, That they squander away their Fortunes extravagantly, make them-
selves incapable of serving the Publick .... To this Head, also, may be
reduced Laws against Gaming, and Prodigality .... And further, under
this Head we may rank all Laws that determine the Rates and Qualities of
Possessions and Estates .... And we may further reduce under this Head
all Laws which determine the Quantity and Measures of Grants and
Legacies .... As, also, certain Laws that forbid certain Subjects to possess
certain Kinds of Goods.... Moreover, Laws against idle and lazy Peo-
ple ... 68
" The book was published in 1672 and translated into English in 1749, shortly before Black-
stone wrote his Commentaries. The complete name is The Law of Nature and Nations: or, a General
System of the most Important Principles of Morality, Jurisprudence, and Politics.
BARON S. PUFENDORF, THE LAw OF NATURE AND NATIONS: OR, A GENERAL SYSTEM OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND POLITICS 827 n.III (Basil Ken-
net trans., London, 5th ed. 1749) (1672).
67 Id.
Id. at 827-28 (footnotes omitted). The quotation omits, among others, Pufendorf's foot-
note to the term "Transcendental Propriety," where he gives the alternative Latin form, "Domin-
ium Eminens," probably in order to clarify the former term's somewhat obscure meaning. It is
worth considering that most commentators on the American Constitution deal with the power
of "eminent domain" immediately before or after dealing with the police power. See, e.g., 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 415 *340; see infra text accompanying note 202.
That contemporary scholarship does likewise is evident from the fact that the police power is
often studied in connection with the constitutional regulation of "takings." See, e.g., D. Benja-
min Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 471 (2004);JohnJ. Cos-
tonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use
Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); D. B. Fawcett III, Eminent Domain, the Police Power,
and the Fifth Amendment: Defining the Domain of Takings Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 491 (1986);
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Thomas, supra note 8, at 501;
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Although Pufendorf does not use the word "police," laws against
gambling, idleness, and prodigality are typical examples of what
would become police regulations.
Blackstone explicitly talks of "polity" and "police" in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, written between 1765 and 1769.69
He addresses the topic twice, first in Book I while dealing with the
prerogative of the king, and later in Book IV when he refers to
public wrongs. In both cases, he follows an approach similar to
Vattel's in that he also places police in the context of the analogy
between king and father (and kingdom and family).
With regard to domestic concerns, the royal prerogative includes
that which derives from the king's position as arbiter of domestic
commerce. In that capacity, he can establish:
[Plublic marts, or places of buying and selling, such as markets and fairs,
with the tolls thereunto belonging. These can only be set up by virtue of
the king's grant, or by long and immemorial usage and prescription,
which presupposes such a grant. The limitation of this public resorts, to
such time and such place as may be most convenient for the neighbour-
hood, forms a part of oeconomics, or domestic polity; which, considering the
kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he clearly has a
right to dispose and order as he pleases.
71
Note that "oeconomics" and "domestic polity" are synonyms. We will
subsequently observe that these terms are also synonymous with
"oeconomy" and "police."72
Further examples of the prerogative of the king are the power to
issue legal tender and "the regulation of weights and measures.,73
The latter "for the advantage of the public, ought to be universally the
Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
Hereinafter, I will follow the first edition of the Commentaries, published in 1765-1769, as
the relevant sections were not significantly changed by the eighth edition of 1778, the last in
Blackstone's lifetime.
70 Ernst Freund, probably the most influential author of the twentieth century in the field of
the police power, stresses the relation between the royal prerogative and the police by calling
the former "royal police power." ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION: AN
ESTIMATE OF RESTRICTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FACTORS 38 (1917).
71 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *264 (emphasis added).
71 "It would seem that 'oeconomy,' 'oeconomics,' 'police,' and 'polity,' were all synonyms as
Blackstone used them." CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 148.
73 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *264. According to Peirce and Cook, the link between
police and the regulation of weights and measures was of old lineage:
After the decline of the Empire and for a long chaotic period there was revived in the
capitularies of Charlemagne a body of regulations for weights and measures, tolls and
markets, the sale of food and cattle and the relief of famine and pestilence. From that
time the orbit of control in a measure marked out by these particulars has, with intermit-
tent consistency, been called "the police."
PEIRCE & COOK, supra note 16, at 52.
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same throughout the kingdom .... ",7 Once more, the idea of police
appears connected with the public domain, and it seems clear too
that police is synonymous with civil administration or, to use an
expression that underscores the analogy I have already referred to,
domestic administration.
We find the concept of police again discussed in Book IV of the
Commentaries, where Blackstone deals with criminal law. Public
wrongs, he affirms, are divided in two. On the one hand, there are
"such crimes and misdemesnors as more especially affect the common-1 kl .75
wealth, or public polity of the kingdom .... On the other hand,
there are "those which are eculiarly pointed against the lives and
security of private subjects, 7 such as homicide or rape. The former
offend the king "as the pater-familias of the nation; to whom it
appertains by his regal office to protect the community, and each
individual therein, from every degree of injurious violence, by
executing. .. laws .... "7 It seems the public dimension is more
apparent in this type of offense. On the contrary, in crimes of the
second group the public interest is involved more indirectly,
inasmuch as a "private subject," the victim of a crime, is harmed.
This private injury does not appear to be a characteristic of the
wrongs in the first group, which more especially affect the
commonwealth or public polity of the kingdom.
The crimes and misdemeanors "that more especially affect the
common-wealth" may be subdivided, according to Blackstone, into
five species: "offences against public justice, against the public peace,
against public trade, aainst the public health, and against the public
police or oeconomy ....
74 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *264 (emphasis added). In the following sentence he
adds: "[but, as weight and measure are things in their nature arbitrary and uncertain, it is
therefore expedient that they be reduced to some fixed rule or standard...." Id.
7' 4 id. at *127. One is tempted to call these "public crimes." Blackstone, however, is con-
tent with referring to them as crimes that "more especially affect the common-wealth," stopping
short of giving them a generic name. The reason for not calling them "public" must be that
crimes "which are peculiarly pointed against the lives and security of private subjects" are also
public crimes. One could say, nonetheless, that the latter are less public than "such crimes and
misdemesnors as more especially affect the common-wealth, or public polity of the kingdom." Id.
76 Id.
" Id. Blackstone did not devise this from scratch. Two centuries earlier, King James I
(James VI of Scotland) had stated the same idea:
By the Law of Nature the king becomes a naturall Father to all his Lieges at his Corona-
tion: And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, educa-
tion, and vertuous gouernment of his children; euen so is the king bound to care for all
his subiects.
KINGJAMES I, THE TRUE LAWE OF FREE MONARCHIES: OR, THE RECIPROCK AND MUTUALL DUETIE
BETWIXT A FREE KING AND HIS NATURALL SUBIECTES B4
v (Edinburgh, R. Waldgrave 1598).
"' 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *128 (emphasis in original).
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Against the lives and security of private subjects
e.g. homicide, rape, assault
SAgainst public justice 1
Against the public
peace
Offenses Against the commonwealth or Against public trade
public polity of the kingdom
Against the public
health
Against the public
_ police or oeconomy
It should be noted that "common-wealth" and "public polity" are
treated by Blackstone as synonyms. We also know that "polity" meant
the same as "police";79 hence it seems surprising that offenses against
the public police (or economy) be one subdivision of offenses against
the public polity (of the kingdom). This flexible use of the language
suggests that Blackstone uses the terms "public polity" and "police" in
two senses: a broader one synonymous with commonwealth, where
they include public justice, peace, commerce, health, and police; and
a narrower and more specific meaning, which comprises only part of
what concerns the common-wealth. What does this part consist of?.
Let Blackstone tell us:
By the public police and oeconomy I mean the due regulation and domestic
order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of
a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to
the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and to
be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
8 0
This is the third instance in which the Commentaries explains police
by making an analogy to the domestic and the familial."' Moreover,
the public dimension of police stands out yet again because these are
"all such crimes as especially affect public society, and are not
comprehended under any of the four preceding species."82 They are,
in other words, "offences against the public order and oeconomical
regimen of the state .... 3  Hence, "[t]his head of offences must
9 Blackstone used "polity" synonymously with "oeconomics," see supra text accompanying
note 71, and "police" synonymously with "oeconomy," see supra text accompanying note 78.
Hence, "polity" and "police" were synonyms, too. This conclusion based on a textual analysis is
further supported by the accepted use of the terms "polity" and "police" in the eighteenth cen-
tury. See supra notes 55-56, 72 and infra Section IV.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *162 (emphasis added).
" For the other two instances, see supra text accompanying notes 71, 77.
82 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *162 (emphasis added).
" Id. at *167 (emphasis added).
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[be] miscellaneous '84 and residuary, without clear contours. The
reference to "public order" throws some light but it ought to be
recalled that in common law systems that term means less than in
civil law. Whereas in the latter, public order goes hand in hand with
public morals and bonos mores,85 in common law "it signifies absence of
disorder (i.e. public peace, tranquility, and safety).,86 Nevertheless,
the analysis of Blackstone's texts shows that good manners are in fact
not foreign to the public order that the king promotes through
police. s7
Blackstone attempts an inventory of crimes against the public
police in Chapter XIII of Book IV of the Commentaies-the same
chapter in which he deals with crimes against public health. That
these two share a chapter is significant, since the other three of the
five species of offenses against the commonwealth are dealt with in
separate chapters (Chapter X for offenses against public justice,
Chapter XI for offenses against public peace, and Chapter XII for
offenses against public trade). Over time, public health would
become one of the goods typically to be promoted by the police
88
power.
The list of offenses against public police reads as follows:8 9
* Clandestine marriages and bigamy
* Idleness and vagrancy (which includes the laws dealing with "idle
soldiers and mariners," and with "Egyptians or gypsies")
* Luxury
* Gaming
* Offenses regulated by game laws, that is, regulations concerning the
hunting of certain types of animals
* Common nuisance
Id. at* 162.
's See, e.g., Article 19 of the Argentine Constitution of 1853: "The private actions of men
which in no way offend order and public morality, nor harm a third party, are reserved to the
judgment of God only, and exempt from the authority of the magistrates...." CONST. ARG.
art. 19. Another illustration can be found in Article 21 of the Argentine Civil Code: "Private
contracts cannot void laws in whose observance public order and good morals are involved."
COD. CIV. art. 21. Similarly, the Chilean Constitution recognizes several fundamental rights sub-
ject to limitations imposed for the protection of morals, good customs, public order and na-
tional security. See, e.g., CONST. CHILE art. 19 §§ 6, 11, 16, 21.
M J. M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 215 (1980). Finnis stresses the differ-
ence between the French and Spanish expressions ordre public and orden psiblico, and the com-
mon law concept of public order. The former are "almost as wide as the concept of public pol-
icy in common law." Id.
87 See supra text accompanying note 80.
Blackstone's examples of offenses against public health, such as the selling of unwhole-
some provisions, are similar to instances of the power of regulation given by James Kent, one of
the first constitutional scholars of the United States. See 2 KENT, supra note 68, at *340; infra
text accompanying note 202.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *163--75.
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This last type of offense against public police deserves separate
comment.90 Blackstone defines common nuisance as "the doing of a
thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to
do a thing which the common good requires."' Unlike private
nuisances, the former "annoy the whole community in general, and
not merely some particular person . . . .""' Common nuisances
constitute a sub-type of offenses against public police. The following
are examples advanced by Blackstone:
93
* Annoyances in highways, bridges, and public rivers
* Offensive trades and manufactures (when detrimental to the public
and notjust to a private person)
* Disorderly inns and ale houses
* Lotteries
* Making and selling of fireworks
II. THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THE IDEA OF POLICE
It is now time to reflect on the extent of the notion of police as we
find it employed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors
such as Pufendorf, Vattel, Smith, and Blackstone. First, as has
become obvious, in those centuries "police" had a very different
meaning from nowadays. It was only much later that the word started
to connote mainly that body of persons-policemen-specialized in
keeping order and investigating crimes.9  Until the nineteenth
century "police" had a wider meaning, which denoted the regulation,
discipline, and control of a community, its civil administration and
the maintenance of public order.95 This meaning survives today in
9 William J. Novak highlights the importance of the law of nuisance in the configuration of
what he calls "the well-regulated society," namely nineteenth-century America, a society in
which, in Novak's view, ideas such as Blackstone's crystallized in legislative practice. WILLIAMJ.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1996).
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *167 (footnote omitted).
Id. at "167-68.
Id. The examples set out in the main text are still common nuisances, now often known
as "public nuisances," in English common law. WINFIELD &JOLOWICZ ON TORT 505 (W-A'. V H.
Rogers ed., 16th ed. 2002).
" The same happened in other romance languages such as Spanish in which policia only
started to mean the body of officials specialized in keeping order as late as the beginning of the
nineteenth century. See COROMINAS & PASCUAL, supra note 15. As for English, Ayto states that
"the first body of public-order officers to be named police in England was the Marine Police, a
force set up around 1798 to protect merchandise in the Port of London." AYTo, supra note 17,
at 402. In Scotland, however, the first recorded use of "police" in specific reference to those
concerned with enforcing the law and maintaining public order is found around 1730.
CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 17.
" Writing in 1832, Francis Lieber stated in the Encyclopaedia Americana that police "in the
common acceptation of the word, in the U. States and England, is applied to the municipal
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the vocabulary of American constitutional law-especially in the
context of the "police power"-but is absent in colloquial English.
Hence, the rhetoric of police as it appears in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century discussions can sound strange to our ears.
From the point of view of criminal law, police was a protected
good of far-reaching scope during the period we have analyzed,
requiring the proscription and regulation of types of conduct that are
so different that it is not easy to discover any common denominator.
Their grouping seems to be defined negatively, comprising in the
criminal field that which both is not included within the crimes
against the lives and security of private subjects, and also is not an
offense against public justice, peace, commerce or health. Apart
from criminal law, police is an object or end of government which
embraces certain subject matters that do not fit properly under the
other main objects of government of which the prince or king has to
take care, namely justice, international relations, taxation, and
eminent domain. 9  Both in the criminal and non-criminal fields
police refers to relations involving a public element. The impact of
an activity on a particular individual, even when it exists, is peripheral
to the idea of police. In offenses against police there is an effect on
the public such that even when it could otherwise be expressed in
terms of offense to an individual-for example, the neighbor that
suffers the nuisance caused by a disorderly inn-the reality is better
conveyed with the language of the common goods protected by
police (public morals, public order, public safety). When it prohibits
or regulates the activities of a disorderly inn, the state government is
for the most part not looking after that individual neighbor, who
perhaps made the complaint, but rather after the peace of the whole
neighborhood and of the entire city.9'
rules, institutions and officers provided for maintaining order, cleanliness, &c ..... By way of
contrast, "in all the great countries of the European continent, there is, besides this police, a
military police extending over the whole state .... " ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA 214 (F. Lieber,
ed., Phila., Carey & Lea 1832).
The same would later happen mutatis mutandis with the police power. See infra note 279.
9' Elaborating upon the modern idea of public order, Finnis makes a similar point:
Inciting hatred amongst sections of the community is not merely an injury to the rights
of those hated; it threatens everyone in the community with a future of violence and of
other violations of right, and this threat is itself an injury to the common good and is
reasonably referred to as a violation of public order. Rioting and bombing, and threats
thereof, are not merely prejudicial to the rights of those killed or injured, but to every-
one who has now to live in a community where such things happen. The operation of a
grossly noisy aeroplane can be said to violate the rights of those awakened and deafened
by it, but the problem is quite reasonably described as one of public order or public nui-
sance and not pinned down to the rights of those who happen so far to have been af-
fected.
FINNIS, supra note 86, at 217-18.
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A more careful look at the texts might take us a bit further.
Because the king is like a paterfamilias he is not only concerned with
preventing his subjects from killing each other or with making war
against the enemy. Because the king is not a mere guarantor of
justice, as the sophist Lycophron had suggested, s9 8 but rather a tender
and wise father (in words which belong to Vattel), he ought to take
care of the community more broadly. This additional responsibility,
which corresponds to the quasi-paternal nature of public authority-
as conceived by these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors-
is police, the well-ordered pursuit of the common good (at least in
those respects not already categorized, such as defense,
administration of justice, etc.). It comprises both regulations of an
economic type'00 (for instance, rules of fairness in trade such as the
establishment of public weights and measures and limitations of
property for the sake of public interest) and other ones dealing with
non-economic matters such as morals and good manners (for
example, prohibition on duelling and vagrancy, and regulation of
disorderly inns and gambling).' °  The inclusion of the latter non-
economic rules indicates that the preservation of public morals was
included within the eighteenth-century understanding of police.
10 2
Notwithstanding that public morals had not been clearly articulated
as a differentiated concept at that time, this conclusion seems
reasonable since the content of non-economic police regulations
coincides with that of the so-called "morals laws" that the states would
introduce and uphold in exercise of their police power in eighteenth-
century America. 
03
"' See 3 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1280b10-11 (T.J. Saunders ed., T. A. Sinclair trans., Penguin
Books 1981).
1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. IV, § 42, at 21.
'o See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *264 (contradicting Crosskey's claim despite catego-
rizing offenses against trade separately from offenses against the public police); see also supra
notes 71, 73 and accompanying text (quoting Blackstone's COMMENTARIES). Contra CROSSKEY,
supra note 47, at ch. VI (denying that in the eighteenth century police regulations included
matters pertaining to commerce).
'0' The line that divides economic from non-economic regulations of police is far from clear.
For instance, sumptuary laws and laws against prodigality protect people from their own ex-
cesses and this has an apparent moral connotation. While doing so, however, they produce an
equally apparent economic impact. The same could be argued with regard to the regulation of
intoxicating liquors, drugs, and cigarettes, which affects the functioning of major industries.
Moreover, a similar argument could be advanced with respect to the regulation of prostitution
and obscenity, and with reference to vagrancy laws. Notwithstanding its limitations, the distinc-
tion between economic and non-economic police rules retains a certain rationale and it has
been accepted by such an authority as Ernst Freund, who distinguishes between "primary social
interests" (security, order, and morality) and "economic interests" when explaining the fields in
which the police power operates in American law. FREUND, supra note 6, at x-xxi.
" CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 150 (exploring police as an object of government).
'03 Even before the existence of the states, the American colonies exercised police powers in
moral questions. Id. at 152.
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The ascription of paternal responsibilities to the sovereign
entailed more than just his authority to legislate in matters affecting
public morality and other matters included in public police. The
characterization of the king as father also grounded another
common law doctrine, parens patriae,104 according to which the
prerogative of the king extended to the care of certain classes of
people who lacked parental care, such as neglected children and
incompetents. °' As with that of police, this doctrine was well-received
by the legal institutions of the United States, where each state
fulfilled the role of parens patriae.'0° The doctrine of parens patriae is
present in some form and under some name in every reasonable legal
system for no reasonable state would wish to violate the basic ethical
imperative of looking after children deserted by their parents-the
most extreme case falling under parens patriae.
Let us turn back to the analogy between king and father which is
at the root both of the idea of public police and of the doctrine of
parens patriae. How far does this analogy reach? Is there any
difference between the end and scope of paternal authority and
those of political authority? These questions relate closely to a
further query: does the authority of the sovereign for the promotion
of police have any limits?' °7 The authors analyzed in the preceding
section do not face these questions squarely, but the very idea of
analogy connotes not only similarity but also some difference.'08 The
'0 As early as 1598, King James I (James VI of Scotland) stated that "the stile of Pater Patriae
was ever, & is commonly used to kings." JAMES I, supra note 77, at D3.
.0 Under parens patriae, charities too were under a special control and care of the govern-
ment of the state. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in Amer-
ica, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1093-94 (1994) (noting the sovereign's power to regulate charities
and similar entities).
'0 In the United States the term "parens patriae" has also been used to name the capacity in
which a state may act for the purpose of protecting the well-being of its entire populace and its
economy, in the context of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide controver-
sies between states or between a state and a citizen of another state. For example, it has been
said judicially that a state as parens patriae has in some cases the right to invoke the original ju-
risdiction of the Court. See G. B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent
or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 907-15 (1976) (exploring the innovation of American courts
in this realm).
117 It should be noted that these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers still did not ar-
ticulate the questions posed in the text in terms of rights that limit state interference. For an
exception, see infta notes 115-16.
0' In the context of patriarchalism, Schochet distinguishes theories that identify king with
father and those that only draw an analogy between the two notions.
An identification requires a total transference of meaning from one entity to the institu-
tion for which it is being used as a symbol. A comparison or simile, on the other hand,
leaves open the questions of the ways in which the two entities or institutions are alike
and different. It allows, and even invites, debate about how well and how much a par-
ticular symbolic explanation fits.
[Vol. 9:3
Feb. 2007] THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POLICE POWER 765
king is not a father, but like a father. In fact, several texts support the
idea that these writers have in mind an analogy that is limited.
Thus, for Vattel, the end or object of civil society is to procure
whatever contributes to the happiness both of itself and of its
individual members: "If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is not
less obliged carefully to preserve all its members. The nation owes
this to itself; since the loss of even one of its members weakens it, and
is injurious to its own preservation."'0 9 Nevertheless, it seems that the
authority of the government for the promotion of happiness is not
unrestricted; rather, its rationale is to secure "the peaceful possession
of property, a method of obtaining justice with security; and, in short,
a mutual defence against all violence from without."" Furthermore,
through the act of political association "each citizen subjects himself
to the authority of the entire body, in every thing that relates to the
common welfare.'. It seems reasonable to infer that what does not
relate to the common welfare remains outside the scope of the
authority of the sovereign. This limitation, however, does not affect
the core of the analogy between king and father, the force of which
can be observed in other texts that reaffirm the wide extent of the
sovereign's authority. Hence:
It is not enough to instruct the nation; it is still more necessary, in order
to conduct it to happiness, to inspire the love of virtue, and the abhor-
rence of vice .... Let him [the prince] employ all his authority in order
to encourage virtue, and suppress vice; let him for this purpose form
public establishments; and to the same end direct his own conduct, his
example, and the distribution of favours, posts, and dignities. Let him
carry his attention even to the private life of the citizens, and banish from the
state whatever is proper only to corrupt the manners of the people."
2
Nonetheless, Vattel observes that "vice may be suppressed by
chastisements, but.., mild and gentle methods can only raise men to
the dignity of virtue: it may be inspired, but it cannot be
GORDON J. SCHOCHET, PATRIARCHALISM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AUTHORITARIAN FAMILY
AND POLITICAL SPECULATION AND ATrITUDES ESPECIALLY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
146 (1975).
' 1 VATIEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. II, § 17, at 13.
"1o Id. bk. I, ch. II, § 17, at 12 n.15.
. Id. bk. I, ch. II, § 17, at 9 n.2 (emphasis added). Note the parallel between the quoted
passage and the following text of Aquinas: "Man is not ordained to the body politic in respect
to all that he is and has... ." ["homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se
totum, et secundum omnia sua"]. 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 21, art. 4,
ad 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 3d
ed. 1942) (c. 1267-73); see also 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. 1, ch. Ill, § 26, at 15 (explaining
that public authority prescribes to each individual the conduct he ought to observe "with a view
to the public welfare").
I12 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. 1, ch. XI, § 115, at 50 (emphasis added).
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commanded."1 13 It is for "politics" to teach the prince in detail the
different means of attaining these desirable ends. In other words, his
power is not subject to a principled limitation but rather to
prudential considerations "on account of the dangers that might
attend the execution, and the abuses that might be made of them. '
'
1
4
There is one exception where Vattel presents a more articulated
doctrine. Religion, he argues, "[a]s it is seated in the heart it is an
affair of conscience, in which every one ought to be directed by his
own understanding: but as it is external, and publicly established, it
is an affair of the state."" 5 Moreover:
A citizen has only the right of never being obliged to do any thing in reli-
gious affairs, and not that of doing outwardly whatever he pleases,
though it may proceed from his regard to society. The establishment of
religion by the laws, and its public exercise, are matters of state, and are
necessarily under the jurisdiction of the public authority.
116
Blackstone for his part also implicitly rejects a complete equation
of paternal and regal authority. In a crucial passage of the
Commentaries dealing with "human laws" he states:
For the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour
of mankind, as they are members of the society, and stand in various rela-
tions to each other, they have consequently no business or concern with
any but social or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so aban-
doned in his principles or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his
wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public
decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices
public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as
drunkenness, or the like) then they become, by the bad example they set,
of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it is then the business of
human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of publication is
what alters the nature of the case.
117
'" Id. Chitty's edition of Vattel's work expresses the idea more clearly: "[M]ild and gentle
methods alone can elevate men to the dignity of virtue... ." VATrEL, supra note 55, bk. I, ch.
XI,§ 115, at 51.
' 1 VArrEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115, at 50; Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at
*165-66 (insisting on numerous occasions that those in authority have to be moderate in the
application of punishment and that it is praiseworthy that some sanguinary laws are applied
with mitigation, if at all).
"' 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. I, ch. XII, § 127, at 54.
.6 Id. bk. I, ch. XII, § 129, at 55.
17 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *119-20. When dealing with criminal law in Book IV of
the Commentaries, Blackstone reiterates this idea in another critical passage:
[H]uman laws can have no concern with any but social and relative duties; being in-
tended only to regulate the conduct of man, considered under various relations, as a
member of civil society. All crimes ought therefore to be estimated merely according to
the mischiefs which they produce in civil society: and, of consequence, private vices, or
the breach of mere absolute duties, which man is bound to perform considered only as
an individual, are not, cannot be, the object of any municipal law; any farther than as by
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This text has an extraordinary parallel with Aquinas's treatment of
the purpose of human law, which perhaps has passed too little
noticed. Writing in the Middle Ages, Aquinas had argued that "[t] he
purpose of human law and the purpose of divine law are different":'
Y 8
For human law's purpose is the temporal tranquility of the state, a pur-
pose which the law attains by coercively prohibiting external acts to the ex-
tent that those are evils which can disturb the state's peaceful condition
(emphasis added). 
19
Moreover, he states that:
The form of community to which human law is directed is different from
the community to which divine law is directed. For human law is di-
rected to civil community, which is a matter of people relating to one an-
other. But people are related to one another by the external acts in which
they communicate and deal with each other. But this sort of communi-
cating is a matter of justice, which is properly directive in and of human
community. So human law does not put forward precepts about any-
thing other than acts ofjustice [ . . ] 120
Finally, when considering whether human law may legitimately
prohibit all vices, Aquinas argues that:
[H]uman law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices,
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that
are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society
could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and
suchlike.'
2
1
The similarities between these texts and Blackstone's are sufficiently
apparent and need no further elaboration.
their evil example, or other pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community, and
thereby become a species of public crimes. Thus the vice of drunkenness ....
4 Id. at *41.
"s AQUINAS, supra note 111, at I-I, q. 98, art. Ic. Finnis has shown that this central thesis
was also set out by Aquinas in a very elaborate and clear way in a series of draft chapters of the
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES which he eventually decided to excise. J. M. FINNIS, AQUINAS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 223-24, 252-53 (1998).
... AQUINAS, supra note 111, at I-I, q. 98, art. Ic.
Id. at I-I, q. 100, art. 2c (emphasis added).
12 Id. at I-Il, q. 96, art. 2c (emphasis added). After analyzing this text, with its reference to
harm ("the hurt of others"), and the many other texts which indicate that human laws should
not interfere with vices that lack a relevant relationship with other persons, Finnis concludes
that Aquinas's position is not readily distinguishable from John Stuart Mill's harm principle. See
FINNIS, supra note 86, at 222-28. R. P. George is of a different view, although he strives to down-
play his divergence from Finnis. See R. P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM.J.JURIS.
17, 28-31 (2000) (analyzing Finnis's position on state enforced morality). Finnis's thesis about
the relationship between Aquinas and Mill could also apply to the relationship between Aquinas
and Blackstone.
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III. THE ORIGIN AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
ANALOGY BETWEEN KING AND FATHER
We can conclude from the preceding section that the idea of
police was, at least to some extent, born of the analogy between king
and father. If this is correct, then the doctrine of police is better
understood if one keeps that analogy in mind. The analogy,
however, was not a creation of Vattel, Blackstone or the other framers
of the concept of police. It was first affirmed by Plato who stated that
the polis and the family only differed in multitudine et paucitate, that is,
in their size. 22 Aristotle criticized him and held the view that polis
and family, and so also political and familial government, are
essentially different, but his reasons are not relevant for the purpose
of this Article. 123  Aristotle's conception prevailed throughout the
Middle Ages, and it was only in early modernity that the analogy
between king and father gained currency as an explanation of
political obligation.2 5 Although it had important and quasi-official
antecedents and sponsorship in the late-sixteenth and early-
seventeenth century, 126 the patriarchal theory emerged in England
through the writings of Sir Robert Filmer, whose book Patriarcha: or
the natural Power of kings was published posthumously in 1680.127 The
analogy-or rather, in the case of Filmer, the equation 2-- of king
and father, which is the key idea of the book, is asserted in its very
title, Patriarcha, which foreshadows Blackstone's reference to the king
122 PLATO, STATESMAN *259bc.
213 See 1 ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 1252a8-19, 1253b19-24; see also id. at 1255b18-19.
12 See SCHOCHET, supra note 108, at 29 ("The moral patriarchal theory was probably totally
absent from medieval political thought, for no thinkers seem to have utilized the image of pa-
ternal authority as a directjustification of political obligation.").
" Id. at 19 ("It was not until the seventeenth century that familial reasoning was used as a
direct justification for political obligation."). Bossuet argues to the contrary that the idea of the
king as father is much older and can be traced to the Old Testament. JACQUE-BENIGNE
BOSSUET, POLITICS DRAWN FROM THE VERY WORDS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE 44 (Patrick Riley ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1709) ("[T]he ancient peoples of Palestine called their
kings Abimelech, that is to say: my father the king. Subjects took themselves to be children of
the prince: and, each one calling him, My father the king, this name came to be shared by all
the kings of the country.").
'S SCHOCHET, supra note 108, at Chapter V; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
' Filmer wrote the book around 1640. The same idea is present in the works of Jacques-
Bnigne Bossuet, the great French bishop who, like Filmer, advanced a theory in favor of the
divine right of kings. In his Politique tirie des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte (Politics Drawn from
the Very Words of Holy Scripture], written between 1679 and 1703, and published posthumously in
1709, Bossuet insisted that the king was to govern his subjects as a good father. Article III of the
Third Book of the Politique is entitled: "Royal authority is paternal, and its proper character is
goodness." See also BOSSUET, supra note 125, at bk. 2, art. III.
121 In Filmer the metaphor gave way to a strict identification (between king and father). See
SCHOCHET, supra note 108, at 148; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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as paterfamilias.129 In the following passage, Filmer elaborates upon
the equation of the role of the father in a family with that of the king
in a state:
If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with those of a King, we find
them all one, without any difference at all, but only in the Latitude or Ex-
tent of them: as the Father over one Family, so the King as Father over
many Families extends his care to preserve, feed, cloath, instruct, and de-
fend the whole Commonwealth... ; so that all the Duties of a King are
summed up in an Universal Fatherly Care of his people.1
3
0
Filmer's idea was part of a lengthier argument in favor of the
absolute and divine right of the king. According to his theory, the
king's fatherly authority was first vested in Adam and by right belongs
to all princes ever since. The theory as such collapsed under the
devastating critique of John Locke,13 ' but the analogy of the king as
father remained an appealing framework for jurists to elaborate
theories of kingly or state power. 32 The doctrines of public police
and parens patriae are important elements of some of those theories. I
will now briefly argue that both doctrines are better understood in
light of an even older tradition of political thought-the classical or
central tradition according to which politics is not conceived on the
model of the family and father, but is part of a wider concern for
ethics, that is, for good and right choices and actions.
On this view, the police for the promotion of public morals
requires an ethical evaluation of the kinds of conduct to be fostered,
regulated or forbidden. For example, in the context of parens patriae,
a judge could not decide what is best for "the child's moral welfare
and the good of society,"'33 in order to decide whether to withdraw
the custody from his or her parents, without making a moral
judgment. Thus, even if judges were to endorse a theory of state
neutrality, they could not take their practical decisions without
having regard to ethical considerations: it is not possible to decide
what is for "the moral welfare" of a person without judging what is
good for him or her. The inappropriateness-as it seems on the
classical view-of aspiring to any thoroughgoing state neutrality
I' I BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *127; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
R. FILMER, PATRIARCHA: OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS 24 n.10 (London, R. Chiswell et
al. eds. 1680). Filmer was echoing KingJames I's ideas. SeeJAMES I, supra note 77.
,' Locke's critique appears in his First Treatise on Civil Government and is summarized again in
Chapter I of the Second Treatise. Both treatises were published in 1689. SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1984); see also JAMES
TYRRELL, PATRIARCHA NON MONARCHA: OR, THE PATRIARCH UNMONARCHED (1681).
..' Not for Locke, however, who explicitly rejects the analogy between king and father, and
patriarchal political theory in general. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 131, at 191, 192.
133 The expression is extracted from an Illinois statute of 1867 passed by the state legislature
in exercise of its function as parens patriae. FREUND, supra note 6, at 249 n.260.
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becomes clear when state organs have to choose the education to be
imparted to children who are under the state's authority in
orphanages and reformatories or, indeed, in state-run schools. None
of that is problematic-at the level of principles-if the relationship
between politics and ethics is conceived in the classical way and the
doctrines of public police and parens patriae are read in continuity
with the central tradition. Thus understood, these doctrines
presuppose ethical judgments similar to those that Aristotle-a key
representative of that tradition-expected from the legislators of the
polis, who of necessity must have an eye to virtue and vice.1
3 4
IV. THE IDEA OF POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES
It has already been pointed out that the writings of Vattel had a
massive influence in the incipient United States of America.3 5
Furthermore, Blackstone's ideas, and through him those of
Pufendorf and other enlightened European thinkers, had more
impact in the United States than in his own country.3 6 Some states
even incorporated into their domestic legislation his classification of
offenses into five species, 37 devoting a separate title to crimes against
police. 138  By contrast, there was no differentiated category called
"police" in British colonial law, in which the term was simply absent.
Nonetheless, there is wide agreement that governments of imperial
colonies around the world had plenary powers in order to preserve
'm See 3 ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 1280b4-5 ("All who are anxious to ensure government
under good laws make it their business to have an eye to the virtue and vice of the citizens."); see
also 7 ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 1323a14-17 ("If we wish to investigate the best constitution
appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life; for if we do not know that,
the best constitution is also bound to elude us.").
' See supra note 51.
' See 2 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (MICROPAEDA) 264 (15th ed. 2002) ("The
fame of Blackstone in the 19th century was greater in the United States than in Blackstone's
native land. After the American Revolution the Commentaries was the chief source of the knowl-
edge of English law in the American republic. A book that in the old country was a textbook
became in the new an oracle of law."); see also Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731, 737 (1976) (noting that
the Commentaries was an instant best seller in the United States).
"4 See supra text accompanying note 78.
' The term "police" appears for the first time as a separate division within a statute in the
Revised Statutes of New York in 1829. In 1836 it was also adopted by Massachusetts and later by
seven other states. FREUND, supra note 6, at § 2, n.2. In a note to an American edition of the
Commentaries, William G. Hammond affirms that Blackstone's enormous influence upon Ameri-
can law "is nowhere more evident than in the important effects produced even upon the inter-
pretation of federal and state constitutions by the recognition of this [head of offenses against
the police] as a distinct power of government, not embraced in the eminent domain, or subject
to its limitations." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 217 (William G. Hammond, ed.,
1890).
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"peace, order, and good government" in their territories. 3 9  This
residual sovereignty had similar contents to Blackstone's police taken
in the widest possible sense, but in the British Empire it lacked a
proper name.
Let us turn now to the incorporation of the idea of police into the
rhetoric of American political and constitutional practice. In his
1953 treatise Politics and the Constitution, 4° William W. Crosskey
undertakes a careful analysis of the use of the term "police" in early
American institutional history. Notwithstanding the harsh criticism
that the book received,' 41 its conclusions regarding the meaning and
scope of police during the foundation of the United States stand on
their own merits, are supported by thorough research, and will
therefore be of assistance in the present inquiry, which is not to say
that my conclusions are the same as Crosskey's.
Due to the influence of Vattel, Blackstone, and others, the
concept of police was part of the discussion that led to the American
Constitution of 1787. Crosskey argues that the term "police" (and
its-in this context-synonym, "polity'' 42) had three meanings in
eighteenth-century North America. First, police and polity had a
's9 "Peace, order, and good government" and "peace, welfare, and good government" were
the two most frequent canonical phrases used in British colonial law to refer to the plenary
powers of the colonies. By virtue of a grant of power to make laws for the peace, order, and
good government of the colony, a British colonial legislature had (and has) legislative power
entirely unrestricted by content and subject-matter (but constrained by territory and by consis-
tency with overriding Imperial statutes). See, e.g., Regina v. Burah, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Bengal H.C.) (holding that, when acting within the limits created by
the Imperial Parliament, the India Legislature had plenary powers of legislation); Winfat Enter.
(HK) Co. v. A-G of H.K., [1985] A.C. 733 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Hong Kong C.A.) (holding
that the Governor of Hong Kong's reclamation of privately held land for public use was not ul-
tra vires). A typical example of this kind of law was the regulation by certain colonial legislatures
of prostitution in sea ports.
'0 In 1980, the University of Chicago Press republished the original text, without modifica-
tion, together with a third volume of this book, with the subtitle "The Political Background of
the Federal Convention." The third volume was co-authored by William Jeffrey, Jr., who edited
the typescript left by Crosskey before his death and added two chapters of his own.
'4 One of Crosskey's central theses-based on an erudite revision of the historical sources of
the American Constitution-is that the federal government of the United States has stronger
powers than has been assumed in conventional wisdom. The author's eagerness to defend a
quasi-omnipotent federal government, which leads him to reinterpret several foundational
texts, endowed his work with a highly controversial character. Tribe recalls that "Crosskey's ef-
forts provoked savage responses," 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at 61, and quotes an ironic statement
from Henry Hart's review of Politics and the Constitution: "The Don Quixote of Chicago breaks
far too many lances in his onslaughts upon the windmills of constitutional history to permit de-
tailed review of each adventure." Id. at n.52 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor Crosskey and
Judicial Review, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1456, 1456 (1954) (book review)). For another significant
critical review of Crosskey, see Robert G. McCloskey, Book Review, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1152
(1953), which argues that Crosskey's work, while analytically exhaustive, was too extreme to be a
valuable contribution to scholarly discourse.
112 "Police" and "polity" had a partially overlapping range of meanings. See supra text accom-
panying notes 53-56.
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meaning that has survived until today: civil government and
administration.13 This meaning of police and polity "was known, and
indeed ancient, in the eighteenth century."'144 Nevertheless, "besides
this still surviving sense, 'polity' had then certain other senses that
now are obsolete."45
Crosskey states that "police" and "polity" had a narrow technical
meaning that can be traced to the writings of Vattel and Blackstone.
Thus understood, these terms "covered only the laws and other
governmental arrangements made to 'preserve the public peace,
tranquility, and concord,' through maintenance of 'public health,
safety, good order, and convenience." 46  Police (or polity) was
therefore an "'object' of government, [which] contemplated the
preservation of domestic tranquility, through maintenance of public
morals and public order, and promotion of public convenience,
public safety and public health.',147  In this sense police and polity
were contrasted with other objects of government such as justice and
the regulation of commerce or trade, although as Crosskey points
out, "a particular legislative act might sometimes be viewed as a
means to some two, or perhaps all three, of the foregoing 'objects
' 48
(that is, police,justice, and commerce).
Police and polity had another technical meaning in the
eighteenth century, "which was quite as common as the meaning just
noted.' 49  In this other meaning, "police" was distinguished from
what was known to the eighteenth century as "policy," or as it was
sometimes called, "the political interest of the nation":
"Policy," in this usage, was defined as the phase of government that had
to do with the "general" affairs of a nation, or the affairs, as it was some-
... According to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the current meanings of the terms "po-
lice" and "polity" is "civil organization." 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcrIONARY, supra note 19, at 22,
35.
144 CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 147.
"5 Id. It does not seem so clear, however, that these other senses have become obsolete. In
fact, it could be argued that they survive to some extent in the vocabulary of the police power,
especially considered in its narrower sense. See infra Section VI.
" CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 147-48 (quoting Vattel).
47 Id. at 150.
,41 Id. Hence Crosskey's conclusion:
There was thus unquestionably a good deal of common ground between 'police' (or
'polity') and 'justice' and 'commerce,' not only with respect to the activities of men that
were acted upon by government under these three general heads of governmental ac-
tion; but as to the governmental actions that might be taken with respect to such activi-
ties, as well. This means that, except with respect to their constituent 'objects,' in the
sense of 'ends,' 'police' (or 'polity') and 'justice' and 'commerce'-i.e. 'the regulation of
commerce'-were not mutually exclusive categories. They were, instead, intersecting
categories,just as most of our legal categories-like crimes, torts, contracts, and property
-are intersecting categories today.
Id. at 150-51.
"' Id. at 151.
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times said, that affected a nation "in the aggregate." "Police," on the
other hand (or, as the phrase very frequently was, "internal police"), was
defined as the phase of government that had to do with the affairs and
derelictions of individuals. The powers relating to "police" in this sense
were sometimes known as "civil" or "municipal" powers, while those relat-
ing to "policy" were commonly called "political."
Hence, according to Crosskey, "policy" included commerce (both
internal and external), war and peace, and diplomacy. These grand
divisions made up "'the entire political interest of a nation,' as distinct
from its 'police,' or, as was sometimes said, its 'internal,' 'civil,' or
'domestic police.' 1 5 ' The domain of "police," in this second sense,
was described as "'the restraining of the turbulent passions of
mankind, the dispencing of justice, and the supporting of order and
regulation in society. "1
5 2
Therefore, Crosskey concludes, the meaning of "police" in this
second technical usage was not very different from its meaning in the
first: the only difference was that, in the second usage, "the
dispencing of justice" was included, whereas, in the first, as we have
153seen, this was not so. Thus, the first technical meaning was
narrower than the second.
Furthermore, "police" and "polity" had a third technical meaning
in eighteenth-century America, especially when coupled with the
adjective "internal" as in "internal police" or "internal polity." This
meaning, which Crosskey incorrectly fails to accept,15 4 can be
observed in the discussions which took place during the First
Continental Congress of 1774. There, the expression was used
several times to contrast the internal police of the colonies with the
powers of Great Britain. A first example is found in a plan of union
between Great Britain and America submitted by Joseph Galloway to
the Congress in September, 1774. The plan suggested:
That a British and American legislature, for regulating the administration
of the general affairs of America, be proposed and established in Amer-
"0 Id. (citation omitted).
"' Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
52 Id. (quoting an anonymous pamphlet published in Philadelphia in 1784 and reprinted in
The New Haven Gazette and Connecticut Magazine in 1787). Crosskey relies heavily on the pam-
phlet to develop the argument that I summarize in the text. The anonymous piece is repro-
duced in an appendix to his book.
... It should be added that by stressing the existence of this second meaning of "police,"
Crosskey sought to support his wider claim that the United States has the constitutional power
to regulate commerce, both internal and external, and that this power is distinct from the po-
lice power retained by the states. The analysis of the merits of this claim lies outside the scope
of this Article.
' See CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 157 (rejecting a meaning of "internal polity" that would
include all governance that is territorially internal); infra note 157 (discussing further Cross-
key's interpretation of "internal polity" in the context of the First Continental Congress).
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ica, including all the said colonies; within, and under which government,
each colony shall retain its present constitution, and powers of regulating
and governing its own internal police, in all cases what[so] ever.
15
Although Galloway's plan was ultimately unsuccessful, a month
later a majority of delegates eventually agreed to a resolution on the
subject of colonial and Parliamentary legislative power. In effect, the
Continental Congress laid claim for each of the separate colonies to
a free and exclusive power of legislation ... in all cases of taxation
and internal polity .... It seems clear, pace Crosskey,'57 that
"internal polity" here-as in Galloway's plan-had a broad meaning,
broader even than Crosskey's second technical meaning. "Internal
polity" in these contexts connoted a realm of local or domestic
sovereignty that entailed a purported limitation for the British
Parliament. The colonies were willing to consent "to the operation of
such acts of the British parliament, as are bona fide, restrained to the
regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the
commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country,
and the commercial benefits of its respective members... ,,158 The
rest, namely taxation and internal polity, was reserved to the colonies.
After the adoption of the Declaration of Independence of the
United States of America on July 4, 1776, which contains no explicit
reference to internal polity, '9 this concern would reappear in the
Articles of Confederation adopted by the Continental Congress in
1777 and ratified by the thirteen new states in 1781. Article II
declared: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled."'16° Although the term "polity" was not used this
" 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 49 (Worthington C. Ford ed.,
1904) (first emphasis added) [hereinafterJOURNALs].
Id. at 68 (emphasis added). Moreover, the first draft of the subcommittee's report on vio-
lations of rights, prepared by John Sullivan in October 1774, stated that
[T] he power of making laws for ordering or regulating the internal polity of these Colo-
nies, is... exclusively vested in the Provincial Legislature of such Colony; and that all
statutes for ordering or regulating the internal polity of the said Colonies ... are illegal
and void,
Id. at 67.
151 Crosskey rejects what he considers the conventional wisdom, viz, that "internal polity" in
these contexts meant each colony's exclusive right of governing everything territorially internal
to it. Rather, Crosskey's view is that the delegates to the Continental Congress understood the
phrase "internal polity" in the two technical meanings already mentioned. See CROSSKEY, supra
note 47, at 157, 171; supra text accompanying notes 146-53. Nevertheless, Crosskey acknowl-
edges that "there are occasional loose uses of 'police' in which the word seems to be practically
synonymous with 'government.'" CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 1304.
1 JOURNALS, supra note 155, at 68-69.
5 id. at 510-15.
0 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (1777) (emphasis added); see also 9 JOURNALS, supra
note 155, at 907-25 (presenting the Articles as adopted by the Congress); 19 JOURNALS OF THE
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time, this "sovereignty" of the states was unquestionably the internal
polity that had been alluded to in the First Continental Congress.
This is confirmed by the wording of the 1776 draft which preceded
the final version of Article II. Article III of that draft, the first
antecedent of Article II of the Articles of 1781, read as follows:
Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of its present Laws, Rights
and Customs, as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and exclu-
sive Regulation and Government of its internal police, in all matters that
shall not interfere with the Articles of this Confederation.1
6 1
Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, the thirteen
states that had separated from Great Britain started to lay down their
own constitutions. Some of them included a Declaration of Rights,
with a specific provision concerning police, which became a
canonical phrase. The following was the typical formulation: "That
the people of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive right of
regulating the internal government and police thereof.'
62
The preamble to the New York Constitution of 1777 refers to "so
important a subject as the necessity of erecting and constituting a
new form of government and internal police, to the exclusion of all
foreign jurisdiction, dominion, and control whatever ....
Similarly, the preamble to the South Carolina Constitution of 1776
stated that "some mode should be established by common consent,
and for the good of the people, the origin and end of all
governments, for regulating the internal polity of this colony.' 64 The
silence of the other original constitutions 65 may well suggest that the
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 213-24 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) (presenting the Arti-
cles as ratified by the states).
.6 5 JOURNALS, supra note 155, at 547 (emphasis added). Article III has similar wording in
the second printed form of this draft: "Each State reserves to itself the sole and exclusive regu-
lation and government of its internal police, in all matters that shall not interfere with the arti-
cles of this Confederation." Id. at 675.
'62 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, art. II. Several states adopted this language with slight variations. See, e.g., DEL. CONST.
of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. IV ("That the people of this state have the sole exclusive and
inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same."); PA. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, art. III ("That the people of this State have the sole, exclusive and
inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same."); VT. CONST. of
1777, Declaration of Rights, art. IV (using language identical to that in the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution). The Massachusetts Constitution approaches that formulation without the term "po-
lice." MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights art. IV ("The people of this commonwealth
have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent
state; and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right
which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the United States of
America, in Congress assembled.").
6.. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.
S.C. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
See GA. CONST. of 1777; N.H. CONST. of 1776; N.J. CONST. of 1776; VA. CONST. of 1776.
Rhode Island, also one of the original thirteen states, did not have a constitution until 1842. See
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principle of the reserve of police to the states was so widely accepted
that it did not need to be expressed.
Furthermore, some states included constitutional provisions
requiring their citizens and governing authorities to recur to
"fundamental principles" in order to "preserve the blessings of
liberty.0 66 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared that "[a]
frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the
constitution, and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice,
moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality, are absolutely
necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free
government." 67  These provisions bear a clear connection with
standards of public morality typically applied in the context of
police. 168
Unsurprisingly, the topic of police was raised in the discussions
which led to the Constitution of the United States. 169 In the Federal
Convention, proposals were made to include in the new Constitution
an "internal police" limitation upon the national power. On
Tuesday, July 17, 1787, Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed a
resolution stating that the federal government would not be entitled
"to interfere with the government of the individual States in any
matters of internal police which respect the government of such
States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is
not concerned." 170  Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania opposed
Sherman's proposal, arguing that "[t]he internal police, as it would
be called & understood by the States ought to be infringed in many
6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3222-35 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., Gov' Prtg. Office 1909).
l E.g., N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § 38; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art.
XXI; PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIV. In North Carolina and New Hamp-
shire, these provisions have survived several constitutional amendments. N.H. CONST. art I, §
38; N.C. CONST. art I, § 35; see also FREDERICJ. STIMSON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1908).
167 MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII. Similar provisions are to be
found in the Virginia Constitution of 1776, Bill of Rights, section 15, and in the New Hampshire
Constitution of 1783, article I, section 38. The Massachusetts provision cited goes on to say:
The people ought, consequently, to have a particular attention to all those principles, in
the choice of their officers and representatives: and they have a right to require of their
lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observance of them, in the formation
and execution of the laws necessary for the good administration of the commonwealth.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII. This provision remains in force.
"" See NOvAK, supra note 90, at 151-52 (discussing the close relationship between law and
morality in colonial America).
'0 See Thomas, supra note 8, at 505 ("The drafters of the U.S. Constitution seem to have had
a police power concept firmly in mind during the creation and ratification of that docu-
ment .... ").
' 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (1911).
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cases, as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens
of other States may be affected.'07  Morris's view prevailed and the
resolution was voted down. A proposal substantially identical to
Sherman's was advanced later by the Committee of Detail but it, too,
was rejected. 72  On September 15, 1787, Sherman repeated his
attempt to obtain an "internal police" limitation, but this time he
faced Madison's opposition and failed again.1
71
The decision of the Federal Convention drafters not to include a
reference to the internal police of the states in the Constitution is
somewhat surprising considering that it would have been in line both
with the position defended by the colonies a few years before in the
Continental Congress, 74 and with the corresponding provisions of
some state constitutions. 75 This omission, however, ought not to be
misconstrued. 76 The silence of the Federal Constitution should be
understood in the context of preceding practice, which clearly
confirmed that internal police remained with the states. Madison put
it clearly in The Federalist, without using the term "police," but tellingly
alluding to the "residuary sovereignty of the states."'77  The
jurisdiction of the federal government, he wrote, "extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.' ' 78  Similarly,
Hamilton wrote:
An intire consolidation of the States into one complete national sover-
eignty would imply an intire subordination of the parts; and whatever
powers might remain in them would be altogether dependent on the
general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Un-
ion or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly retain all the
rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that
act exclusively delegated to the United States.'79
... NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON
303 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
172 According to this proposal, made on August 22, 1787, Congress would have been given
power to provide for the "general interests and welfare of the United States in such manner as
shall not interfere with the Governments of individual States in matters which respect only their
internal Police, or for which their individual authorities may be competent." 2 THE REcoRDs OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 170, at 367.
... NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 171, at 649-50. The wording
of this proposal was similar to that of the previous ones.
'74 See 5JOURNALS, supra note 155, at 547 (illustrating the importance of the police power in
drafting the Articles of Confederation).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 162-64 (summarizing the role of the police power in
early state constitutions).
171 Cf CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 153, 1304 (observing the flexible meaning of the word "po-
lice" in this context).
177 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 186 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
178 Id.
'n THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 177, at 145-46.
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The principle stated in these passages of The Federalist follows from
the enumeration of powers granted to Congress by Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution. As Chief Justice Marshall would assert in the
famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden, "The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated ....
In modem times, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this idea, relying
on Article I, Section 8 to hold that "[t]he Constitution... withold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation."'"" At any rate it is obvious
that, as Scheiber puts it, the historical significance of the concept of
police "derives from usage and application, not from the language of
the Constitution itself. Nowhere in the Constitution does the term
appear. '082 It* was for one of the Constitution's 1789 Amendments,
however, to explicitly introduce the idea of "police" (if not the actual
word) into the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment reads as
follows:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. 
s
8
Although there are conflicting interpretations of this
Amendment, s4 it has been plausibly argued that, without prejudice to
the argument from Article I, Section 8, the Amendment functions as
a principal constitutional basis of state police power" 5 and that "[t] he
police power is one of the powers reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment.' '8 6 Thus the Tenth Amendment effectively captures the
idea of the "residuary sovereignty of the States,"'8' albeit without using
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (holding that Congress does not have
authority to regulate firearms in school zones).
182 Scheiber, supra note 10, at 1744. Pomeroy explains the constitutional silence on police by
stating that it was not necessary to mention it because police measures are simply part of the
general system by which each state endeavors to protect the good morals, lives, health, persons
and property of its inhabitants. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 226 (4th ed. 1879); see also Randy E. Barnett, The
Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 476-78 (2004) (noting that the term
.police" was used throughout the constitutional debates in reference to the powers not granted
to the federal government).
"8' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
... See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 442-48 (14th
ed. 1978) (recounting some of the conflicting interpretations of the Tenth Amendment over
the years).
185 NOVAK, supra note 90, at 13.
186 LAWRENCE B. EVANS, LEADING CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1226 (2d ed.
1925).
,87 See supra text accompanying notes 157-58. It should be noted that the sovereignty we are
talking about is limited by the powers-some of them exclusive, some concurrent-delegated to
the general government. As one of the delegates put it in the Federal Convention of 1787,
"[t]he States were not 'Sovereigns' in the sense contended for by some. They did not possess
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the term "police." At any rate, it became clear that police-or the
police power, as it was later called'S-was treated as vested in the
states, insofar as they were considered governments of general
jurisdiction. The federal government, on the other hand, was
conceived of as a government of delegated and enumerated powers,
and therefore it was not constitutionally authorized to exercise police
189
powers.
This state of affairs changed, however, with the transformation of
business that followed the First World War; "[e]nterprises that had
once been local or... regional in nature had become national in
scope." 9 ° This entailed, among other things, a clear increase in
federal regulations, most enacted under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution,' 9' which gives Congress the power, inter alia, to regulate
commerce among the states. Although the delegated powers
doctrine and the concomitant reservation of the police power to the
states remained (and remain) true in theory, for many practical
purposes "the government of the United States functions as a
government of generaljurisdiction.
Nevertheless, a landmark 1995 decision of the Supreme Court
sought to put a limit to the ever-expanding reading of the Commerce
Clause and reaffirm the basic principles of federalism. In United States
v. Lopez, 93 the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act and thus invalidated, for the first time in nearly sixty years, a
the peculiar features of sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor trea-
ties." NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 171, at 152; see also id. at 217 (describing remarks by several
delegates to the effect that the states had never been completely sovereign and independent).
See infra Section V.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("Th[e] [federal] gov-
ernment is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can
exercise only the powers granted to it... is now universally admitted."); see also George, supra
note 121, at 21 ("In the United States, the governments of the states are, in form, at least, gov-
ernments of general jurisdiction. They exercise police powers legally subject only to state or
federal constitutional limitations on the scope of their authority.... In this respect, the gov-
ernments of the states differ markedly-again, in form, at least-from the government of the
United States. The latter government is not a government of general jurisdiction .... "); G. H.
Reynolds & D. B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 533 (2000) ("[S]tate governments have a police power, and the
federal government does not.").
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
'9' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ... ").
,' George, supra note 121, at 22-23. George actually says that the United States now func-
tions as a government of general jurisdiction for "all practical purposes." Id. at 22. But this is
something of an overstatement, especially in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez,
discussed in the main text. Writing in 1925, Evans had already asserted that, although there is
no federal police power, "in the exertion of the authority with which it is vested, the Federal
Government may adopt measures which have the quality of police measures .... " EVANS, supra
note 186, at 1226.
'93 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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congressional reliance on its commerce power. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court:
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Gov-
ernment of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. AsJames Madison wrote:
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State• 1,194
governments are numerous and indefinte.
The Court concluded its reasoning by making explicit reference to
the police power:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile in-
ference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States .... To do so would require us to con-
clude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presup-
pose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinc-
tion between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are
unwilling to do.1
95
Moreover, the Court recently decided two cases that illustrate the
extent to which questions surrounding the police power are still im-
portant today. In Gonzales v. Raich,'96 a majority of the Court held that
the Federal Controlled Substances Act, which prevents ill people
from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana for their
personal medical use, does not infringe the reserved powers of Cali-
fornia. The decision was based on an expansive reading of the
Commerce Clause. The dissenters considered this interpretation of
the Clause incompatible with the police power of the states. Accord-
ing to Justice O'Connor, who wrote the main dissenting opinion,
" Id. at 552 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison)). Although the four dissenting
Justices would have upheld the Gun-Free School Zones Act on Commerce Clause grounds, they
were not willing "to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government to regu-
late any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens, to
regulate marriage, divorce, and child custody, or to regulate any and all aspects of education."
Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas rightly
pointed out that in this important respect there was agreement with the majority's view. Id. at
585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Constitution does not allow the federal gov-
ernment to regulate "marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals"); see id. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(rejecting the United States's argument that the Commerce Clause grants plenary power to
regulate absolutely any activity related to "national productivity"); id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of tradi-
tional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities,
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political re-
sponsibility would become illusory."). On the relatively minor impact of Lopez in preventing the
federalization of crime, see John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local
Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 674 (1999).
195 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (citing the enumerated powers of the Constitu-
tion as proof of no federal police power).
' 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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"[t]he States' core police powers have always included authority to
define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens, " 97 and California's Compassionate Use Act, which au-
thorizes limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes, is well within
those powers. In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the
majority's decision "threatens to remove the remaining vestiges of
States' traditional police powers. " gs
Finally, in the 2006 case Gonzales v. Oregon,'99 the Court recalled
that "the structure and limitations of federalism.., allow the States
great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protec-
tion of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.,,200
V. A QUESTION OF NAMES: FROM "POLICE" TO "THE POLICE POWER"
The idea of police received different names in the United States.
James Kent, one of the first constitutional scholars and a professor at
Columbia University, described the "power of regulation" of the
states in his Commentaries on American Law in terms that bring to mind
the analyses of Pufendorf, Vattel, and Blackstone:
2 0°
But though the property be thus protected, it is still to be understood
that the lawgiver has a right to prescribe the mode and manner of using
it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right to the in-
jury or annoyance of others, or of the public. The government may, by
general regulations, interdict such uses of property as would create nui-
sances, and become dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or com-
fort of the citizens. Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations
offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam-
power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the
burial of the dead, may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense
masses of population, on the general and rational principle, that every
person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and
that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of
the community.202
It seems clear that this "power of regulation" embraces much of
the European idea of police. °2 In fact, as Corwin comments, in due
197 Id. at 42 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 66 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
"o Id. at 923 (internal citations omitted).
291 As a matter of fact, Kent expressly cites Pufendorf and Vattel when dealing with the power
of regulation. 2 KENT, supra note 68, at *340 n. (b).
Id. at *340.
N3 Although Kent does not use the word "police" when he explains the power of regulation,
he uses it elsewhere. See, e.g., I id. at *43 ("The consular convention between France and this
country, in 1778, allowed consuls to exercise police over all vessels of their respective na-
tions .... .") (emphasis added).
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course Kent's "power of regulation" became the "police power" of
American constitutional doctrine. 4 It was for the most part the
Supreme Court that brought about this transformation.
The term "police power" did not come into general legal use until
the 1880s,205 nearly a half century after it was first introduced by Chief
Justice John Marshall in the 1827 decision, Brown v. Maryland.°6 He
had already raised the idea in earlier cases, and for this reason it has
207been said to have come to him by degrees. For example, in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Chief Justice wrote that "the
framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the
regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal
government .... ,08 We find here the word "internal," a key notion
in Blackstone's understanding of police.2°9
In Gibbons v. Ogden, which also preceded Brown v. Maryland, the
word "police" comes to the surface for the first time in American
Supreme Court case law. In another opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court stated with reference to inspection laws that:
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces
every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State... are component parts of this mass.
m0 EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOvERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE
OF A FAMOuSJURIDICAL CONCEPT 88 (1948); see also Hastings, supra note 6, at 365-66 (discussing
the evolution of the concept and pinpointing Brown v. Maryland as the origin of the term). In
the famous Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873),Justice Miller wrote for the
Supreme Court that Kent's power of regulation was indeed the police power and quoted the
text from Kent above transcribed.
The term "police power" is not defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary until the 1883 edition,
and the 1898 edition of this standard dictionary says that the law on this subject is all of recent
growth. Moreover, "[i]t was not until 1879 that [the phrase] began to appear among the subdi-
visions of constitutional law in the annual supplements of [the United States Digest.]" Hastings,
supra note 6, at 359-60.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). In his lucid essay, "The Development of Law as Illus-
trated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State," W. G. Hastings states that a
.somewhat careful search for the phrase fails to find it in legal or political writings of this coun-
try prior to that time [when Brown v. Maryland was decided]." Hastings, supra note 6, at 360.
Nevertheless, as Crosskey says, "[t] he phrase 'police power' is so natural a phrase, in view of the
notions of the time, that it is difficult to believe that it was never used before Marshall used it in
this particular case... ." CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 1305. Hastings himself seems to be of the
same view: "It was entirely natural that it should appear in a decision of our Federal Supreme
Court and from ChiefJustice Marshall." Hastings, supra note 6, at 360.
Hastings, supra note 6, at 363.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819).
Blackstone used the expression "domestic," rather than "internal." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 64, at *162. The term "internal" was present in the constitutional history of the states and
of the United States. See supra notes 156-83 and accompanying text.
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No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress;
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.210
A few pages later, the Chief Justice connects this residuary legislative
power of the states with police when he speaks of "[t]he
acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic
trade, and to govern its own citizens... .,21"' Further, he adds, "in
exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs,
whether of trading or police, the States may ... enact laws .... ,,22As
Hastings says, he "has not quite reached the term [police power], but
the conception is almost, if not quite, complete."
21 3
In the Brown case three years later, Chief Justice Marshall finally
speaks explicitly of the "police power," distinguishing it from certain
taxation powers concerning imports and exports that the
Constitution grants Congress:
The counsel for the defendant in error have endeavored to illustrate
their proposition, that the constitutional prohibition [i.e., the Imports
and Exports Clause of the American Constitution] ceases the instant the
goods enter the country, by an array of the consequences which they
suppose must follow the denial of it. If the importer acquires the right to
sell by the payment of duties, he may, they say, exert that right when,
where, and as he pleases, and the State cannot regulate it .... He may in-
troduce articles, as gunpowder, which endanger a city, into the midst of
its population; he may introduce articles which endanger the public
health ....
[But t]he power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of
the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with
the States.
21 4
Thus, from police there emerged naturally, as it were, the police
power. In effect, the "combined phrase," as the latter has been
called,2 5 is nothing but a different name for the old idea of police.1 6
2" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
21l Id. at 208; see also id. at 204 ("If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another,
in the same State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power expressly
granted to Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely internal
commerce of a State, or to act directly on its system of police.") (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added). In the same paragraph, the Supreme Court makes refer-
ence once more to "a power to regulate [the States'] domestic trade and police."
2' Hastings, supra note 6, at 364.
2"4 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827) (emphasis added). Citing
this case, Freund explains that "[t]he federal Supreme Court first employed the term [police
power] to indicate the otherwise undefined mass of governmental powers reserved to the
states." Ernst Freund, Police Power, in CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 706 (Andrew
McLaughlin et al. eds., 1914). The dissent in Brown v. Maryland alludes to "the internal police
of the States," referring to the same thing. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 454 (Thompson, J., dissent-
ing).
2"5 Hastings, supra note 6, at 366.
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This is confirmed by judicial decisions that talk alternatively of police
and police power to refer to the same thing. One example, among
others, 21 7 is Justice Field's celebrated opinion for the Court in Barbier
v. Connolly. '8 He first says that a local ordinance prohibiting the
washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash houses
within certain limits of a city and at certain hours is "purely a police
regulation within the competency of any municipality possessed of the
ordinary powers belonging to such bodies."2' 9 Later on, he chooses to
address the question using the name "police power:"
In the execution of admitted powers unnecessary proceedings are often
required which are cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive, yet, if no dis-
crimination against anyone be made and no substantial right be impaired
by them, they are not obnoxious to any constitutional objection.... In
the case before us the provisions requiring certificates from the health
officer and the Board of Fire Wardens may, in some instances, be unnec-
essary, and the changes to be made to meet the conditions prescribed
may be burdensome, but as we have said, this is a matter for the determi-
nation of the municipality in the execution of its police powers, and not a
violation of any substantial right of the individual.
..6 Walter W. Cook saw this clearly in a short but significant article published in 1907:
Is there any connection between the two phrases? I believe that there is, and that a study
of the subsequent history will show that the one was substituted for the other, and that
the more modern phrase, "the police power," is to-day used by our courts in much the
same sense that the earlier phrase ["internal police"] was used in the convention by the
framers of the constitution.
Cook, supra note 11, at 326.
217 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (mentioning the various assignations for
the police). Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, speaks of "police powers of the State," id. at
661, and further alludes to "police regulations," id. at 662. In both cases, he is pointing at en-
actments prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 236-40. A similar example is to be found in Patterson v. Kentucky:
By the settled doctrines of this court the police power extends, at least, to the protection of
the lives, the health, and the property of the community against the injurious exercise by
any citizen of his own rights. State legislation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes,
does not, in the sense of the Constitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which
has been confided, expressly or by implication, to the national government. The Ken-
tucky statute under examination manifestly belongs to that class of legislation. It is, in
the best sense, a mere police regulation, deemed essential to the protection of the lives and
property of citizens.
97 U.S. 501, 504 (1878) (emphasis added).
218 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
219 Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
o Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Another example of a judicial decision that illustrates the
natural emergence of the police power from the idea of police is the following oft-quoted dic-
tum of ChiefJustice Redfield in the Supreme Court of Vermont:
We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways in this respect, may
be found in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law-
making power in all free states .... This police power of the state extends to the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all
property within the state.
Thorpe v. Rutland, 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1855) (emphasis added).
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William J. Novak sums up the point when he asserts that the
"substantive roots of state regulatory power [police power, are found]
in early modem notions of police .... In fact, the concept of
police power as received in the Brown case and its progeny is a broad
one, which comprises at the same time the idea of residuary
sovereignty,222 the second of the technical meanings of police in the
eighteenth century22 and Kent's power of regulation. 4
Finally, it should be pointed out that, by and large, the expression
"police power" has replaced the term "police" in the vocabulary of
American constitutional law. The different editions of a typical
American encyclopedia bear witness to this evolution. The 1832
edition of the Encyclopaedia Americana asserted that police, "in the
common acceptation of the word, in the U. States and England, is
applied to the municipal rules, institutions and officers provided for
maintaining order, cleanliness, &c.,,225 In twentieth-century editions,
this definition gives way to the present, common meaning of police,
the branch of the criminal justice system that has the specific
responsibility of maintaining law and order and combating crime
within the society.22 6 Something similar to what appeared before in
the entry for "police" comes now in the entry for "police power,"227 an
entry absent from the 1832 edition.
VI. THE POLICE POWER, BROAD AND NARROW
In the early cases that I have reviewed, the phrase "police power"
was used as a synonym for the Federalist Papers' "residuary sovereignty
of the states,, 228 "namely, that general authority not surrendered to
the General Government, and reserved severally by each State to
regulate in the manner that each should see fit all the matters of local
concern.''29 In other words, "police power" was equivalent to the
2 NOVAK, supra note 90, at 13.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 160, 178.
" See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
4 See supra text accompanying note 202.
,a ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 95, at 214.
'6 22 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA INT'L EDITION 299-301 (Americana Corp. 1980)
(1829) (describing the history and current practices of police around the world).
221 Id. at 301.
's THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 178; see supra text accompanying note 178 (discussing
this concept further).
22 3 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1766 (2d ed. 1929). Similarly, Cook defines the police power as "the unclassified, residuary
power of government vested by the constitution of the United States in the respective States."
Cook, supra note 11, at 329. Likewise, Barros notes that "the police power, as a concept of
American constitutional law, is synonymous with the entirety of the sovereign power of the
states that remained after the constitutional grant of limited powers to the federal government."
Barros, supra note 68, at 472.
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"internal polity" to which the First Continental Congress had laid
claim for the colonies ° and to the "internal police" that came up in
the discussions which led to the establishment of the Federal
Constitution.23 ' Hence, "the term was not used to designate a special
branch or sphere of the States' legislative authority; rather, it was
employed to mark off the sphere of State authority from that of the
General Government. 2 32 It was, it has been argued, a catchword, "a
brief formula for the expression of the federalist idea of the state's
functions in the federal system."233 Although the police power was
not conceived of by the Supreme Court "as including familiar forms
of the exercise of ... [the state's] sovereignty, to which definite
names had already attached, such as 'eminent domain,' 'taxation,'
and 'administration of justice,' etc. .... [in practice it was] recognized
[by the Court] to embrace them, or rather as not to be separable
from them."234
This broad meaning of the police power was articulated most
clearly by Chief Justice Taney in his opinion in the License Cases-
[W]hat are the police powers of a state? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the ex-
tent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a
law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring cer-
tain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own
limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power
to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion. It is by virtue
of this power that it legislates ....
2o See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
211 See supra text accompanying note 170.
2 3 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 229.
:3 Hastings, supra note 6, at 372.
Id. at 405. But see Cook, supra note 11, at 329 ("In other words, we have taken the residu-
ary powers of government possessed by the States in our system-the 'residuary sovereignty' of
The Federalist-have classified and given specific names to certain parts, e.g., power of taxation,
of eminent domain, etc., and then, perhaps for want of a better term, have called what is left
'the police power.'").
Ucense Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847). Earlier formulations of the broad con-
cept, in terms of "internal police," include Justice Barbour's oft-quoted dictum in Mayor of New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 103 (1837), that "[a]ll those powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation, or which may more properly be called internal police, are not surren-
dered or restrained; and, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete,
unqualified and exclusive." Also in Miln, Justice Thompson posed the following rhetorical
question: "Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regulation of a
state, than that which concerns the care and management of paupers or convicts,.... ?" Id. at
148 (Thompson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Proprietors of Charles River Bridge
v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 552 (1837) ("We cannot deal thus with
the rights reserved to the states; and by legal intendments and mere technical reasoning, take
away from them any portion of that power over their own internal police and improvement,
which is so necessary to their well being and prosperity.").
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Crosskey has argued that Chief Justice Taney's opinion in this case
implied a departure from inherited wisdom and that his explanation
of the police power differs substantially from that of his predecessor
Chief Justice Marshall, and from the eighteenth-century
understanding of police.' 6 Nevertheless, as I have already suggested,
there is a clear line of continuity between the License Cases and the
idea of the residuary sovereignty of the states present in the
Continental Congress, 7 in the Federalist Papers,238 and in Chief Justice
Marshall's key opinions.
2 39
Alongside this broad concept of police power a narrow one
started to emerge. By the end of the nineteenth century, the states
were trying to justify the enforcement of local regulations affecting
interstate commerce, the control of which was in principle reserved
to the federal government, by arguing that the regulations in
question were reasonably required for the protection of certain
public goods, viz. public health, public safety, and public morals.
The promotion of these goods was essential to the police power of
the states, it was claimed. Thus, as Willoughby rightly puts it:
[Tihe phrase police power, by degrees, came, in practice, to refer not to
the general residuary powers of the States but to their right to provide
and enforce reasonable regulations in behalf of the morals, safety and
convenience of their inhabitants, even when interstate commerce or
some other subject of Federal control was incidentally or indirectly,
240
though often substantially, affected.
Under this narrow meaning, the police power designated a
particular branch of state legislative authority, namely the one aimed
at promoting public health, public safety, and public morality. A
paradigmatic example of this conception of the police power can be
observed in Mugler v. Kansas.24' Decided in 1887, this is a case in
Crosskey argues that Chief Justice Taney manufactured a new theory of the police power
of the states in his License Cases opinion-a theory which, according to Crosskey, was at the same
time of vast importance in the development of the "states' rights" doctrine and without founda-
tion in accepted usage. CROSSKEY, supra note 47, at 154-55.
"7 See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
" See supra text accompanying note 178.
See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827) ("[T]he police
power... unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States."). For a later pre-
License Cases decision in the same vein, see Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139, where the Court de-
termined that all issues relating to municipal legislation are necessarily under state power.
Hastings is of a view similar to that adopted in the text: "He [Chief Justice Taney] was, as he
firmly believed, carrying out not only the intentions of the framers of the constitution [...] but
Marshall's judicial opinion as well." Hastings, supra note 6, at 387.
20 3 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 229, at 1766-67.
241 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the
police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or need-
ful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety."). Another
case conceiving of the police power as the authority to protect public morals, public health, and
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which a Kansas statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors had been challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.42  The Supreme Court
acknowledged the jurisdiction of the state legislature with respect to
the promotion of public morals, health, and safety, and grounded
that jurisdiction in the police power:
[B]y whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the
manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for general use or for
the personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect the public? Power to
determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else
society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own ap-
petites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of
the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under
our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the
police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are
appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health,
243
or the public safety.
Nonetheless, the Court in this case made it clear that the mere
allegation by a state that the police power thus understood was at
stake would not suffice. There must exist a substantial relation
between the chosen means and the ends, goods, or values
purportedly promoted; that is to say public morals, health, or safety.
Hence:
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the pro-
motion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the po-
lice powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which leg-
islation cannot rightfully go.... If, therefore, a statute purporting to
have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the
public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty
of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
4
public safety was Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock & Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., in which the Court stated, "[w]hile we are not prepared to
say that the legislature can make valid contracts on no subject embraced in the largest definition of
the police power, we think that, in regard to two subjects so embraced, it cannot, by any contract,
limit the exercise of those powers to the prejudice of the general welfare. These are the public
health and public morals." 1II U.S. 746, 750-51 (1884) (some emphasis added); see also New Or-
leans Gas Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 672 (1885) (acknowledging that states still
maintain the right to regulate contracts with respect to public health, morals, and safety).
112 The Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified in 1868, scarcely twenty years before
Muglerwas decided. Its relevant part reads as follows: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
243 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (emphasis added).
2" Id. at 661.
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In other words, the Court announced that in the absence of a
substantial relationship between means and ends, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be compromised and
the legislative enactment would be unconstitutional. In Mugler,
however, the Court found that the prohibition in question was a
reasonable restriction of rights in order to protect the morals, health,
and safety of the public.245
Mugler v. Kansas, together with other post-Fourteenth
Amendment cases such as Barbier v. Connolly, stands for the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment does not take "from the
States of the Union those powers of police that were reserved at the
time the original Constitution was adopted., 246  This is just a
confirmation that the old doctrine of internal police remained in
place after the Civil War: "[T]he police power which had remained
with the States in the formation of the original Constitution of the
United States ... had not been taken away by the amendments
adopted since.
It can also be reasonably argued that Mugler became the starting-
point of a new understanding of the police power,248 an
understanding which is different from but not incompatible with the
previous one. Even as the old broad idea of the residuary sovereignty
of the states remained, the new narrow concept which restricted the
scope of the police power to the promotion of public morals, health,
and safety gained currency in Mugler and other late-nineteenth-
century cases. 249 As Nowak and Rotunda put it:
25 See id. at 662 ("[W]e cannot shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety, may be endangered by the general use
of intoxicating drinks .... ").
2 Id. at 663; see also id. at 664 ("It cannot be supposed that the States intended, by adopting
that Amendment [i.e., the Fourteenth], to impose restraints upon the exercise of their powers
for the protection of the safety, health, or morals of the community."); Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31 (1885) ("[N]either the [Fourteenth] amendment-broad and comprehensive as it
is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes
termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, educa-
tion, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.").
... Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock & Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 747 (1884); see also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) ("[The police power] belonged to the States when the Federal Consti-
tution was adopted. They did not surrender it, and they all have it now.").
' See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1686 (9th ed. 2004) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH SERV.] (iden-
tifying MugLer as the starting point for the conception of the police power as solely controlling
the public safety, health, and morality).
'49 E.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 (1888) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine, reasoning that "[i]t is scarcely necessary to say
that if this statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of
the health of the people, and for the prevention of fraud, it is not inconsistent with that [the
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The Mugler decision gave notice that the Court would begin evaluating
the relationship of a law to its purported purposes. A statute had to have
a substantial relation to the protection of the public health, morals, or
safety before the Court would sustain the measure as a valid exercise of
250the state's police power.
This was the consequence of reading some substantial content
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court recognized Mugleis relevance in its famous abortion
decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
stating that "for at least 105 years, since Mugler v. Kansas... the
Clause has been understood to contain a substantive
component... one 'barring certain government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'51
The substantive due process philosophy reached its peak, of
course, with Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905. Lochner called for
a closer scrutiny of the means-ends relationship than the one
required by Mugler and also for judicial assessment of legislative
ends themselves. During the so-called Lochner era,2s the Supreme
Court forcefully used the Due Process Clause to outlaw regulations
aimed at social and economic control, such as minimum wage 255 and
maximum hour laws.5 6 In doing so, the Court adopted a narrow
Fourteenth] Amendment; for it is the settled doctrine of this court that, as government is or-
ganized for the purpose, among others, of preserving the public health and the public morals,
it cannot divest itself of the power to provide for those objects; and that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the States").
2- NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 407.
251 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (citations omitted).
2152 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York labor law establishing maximum working
hours in bakeries).
s Tribe explains that during the Lochner era, "the Court interpreted its requirement of a
substantial means-ends relationship so as to invalidate statutes which interfered with private eco-
nomic transactions unless traditional (even if evolving) common law concepts demonstrated a
proper fit between the legislation and its asserted objectives." 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1346.
He further claims that "Lochner itself provides the best example of such strict and skeptical
means-ends analysis." Id.
' The Lochner era started with Lochner in 1905 but had been foreshadowed in Allgeyer v. Lou-
isiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), in which a Louisiana statute that prohibited any person from issu-
ing insurance on property in the state with companies that had not been admitted to do busi-
ness in the state was invalidated. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Peckham, the same Justice
who a few years later wrote the majority opinion in Lochner, held that the statute exceeded the
state's police power and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it infringed the liberty to contract for insurance.
255 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923) (deciding that regulation on
minimum wages for women and children were beyond the limitations of the police power).
2 Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Other famous Lochner-era cases include Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), both invalidating legislation for-
bidding employers to require employees to agree not to join a union. In the latter case the
Court underlined the narrower meaning of the police power, reasoning that "[t]he police
power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it,
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definition of the police power. 57 The Court first asserted that a
certain right, typically the liberty of contract, was protected under the
Due Process Clause. It then stated that an invasion of that liberty
could only be justified by a proper exercise of the police power.
Finally, the Court concluded that the state's police power existed only
for certain limited objectives, namely, the promotion of public
health, safety, and morals, and that economic purposes were outside
its proper, rather narrow scope .2 5  This was the official Lochner-era
doctrine, notwithstanding the declarations to the contrary that may
be found in Lochner itself 59 and in other Lochner-era cases in which a
broader meaning of the police power was employed. 2 6 0 For example,
in Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, decided in 1907, the Court stated
that:
Decisions of this Court, familiar to all, and which need not be cited, rec-
ognize the possession, by each State, of powers never surrendered to the
General Government; which powers the State, except as restrained by its
own constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert not
only for the public health, the public morals and the public safety, but
for the general or common good, for the well-being, comfort and good
261order of the people.
without in effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty [of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment]." Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
257 Barros takes a similar view:
[T]he doctrine [of economic substantive due process] represented a significant attempt
to limit the scope of the police power, and the nature of the police power plays an im-
portant role in the Supreme Court cases that represent both the apex and the demise of
economic substantive due process-Lochner and Nebbia v. New York.
Barros, supra note 68, at 488 (footnote omitted). Barros goes on to explain that in Lochner, Jus-
tice Peckham "fram[ed] the scope of the police power in a narrow fashion." Id. at 489.
2 As Stone et al. put it:
If the Court believed the regulation was truly designed to protect the health, safety, or
morals of the general public, it was apt to uphold the law. But if the Court perceived the
law to be an effort to readjust the market in favor of one party to the contract, it was
more likely to hold the regulation invalid.
STONE ET AL., supra note 5, at 757.
2 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 ("[The police power] relate[s] to the safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of the public... ." (emphasis added)).
m Although nearly two hundred economic regulations were struck down during the Lochner
era, many others survived constitutional challenge. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at
466; STONE ET AL., supra note 5, at 756.
' 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907). Other cases of this period considered "general welfare" or "gen-
eral prosperity" as legitimate police power ends. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915)
("[The police power] embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or the
general prosperity or welfare .... ."); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18 (1915) ("[I]t has been
held permissible for the States to adopt regulations fairly deemed necessary to secure some ob-
ject directly affecting the public welfare ... ."); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912)
(stating that the use of the police power is valid to "promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity"); Chic., Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(1906) (holding that a railway company can be charged for the expenses needed to rebuild its
bridge and culvert in compliance with statute); Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works,
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In 1919 the Court explicitly affirmed the coexistence of the broad
and the narrow meanings of the police power:
[T]he words "police power" [are] susceptible of two significations, a
comprehensive one embracing in substance the whole field of state au-
thority and the other a narrower one including only state power to deal
with the health, safety and morals of the people.
At any rate, it is clear that after the demise of the Lochner era in the
mid-1930's, the police power (in its narrow, substantive sense) grew
to encompass more than just the promotion of public morals, health,
and safety. In 1934, the Supreme Court approved Minnesota's• 26'
mortgage emergency regulations and upheld New York's milk priceS 264
control regulations. Both statutes were deemed to be valid
exercises of the police power of the states. As Tribe says, those
decisions were the beginning of the judicial abdication of
responsibility for review of the substance of government economic
choices-and the collapse of Lochner.65
The Lochner era came to an end when, in 1937, for reasons that
will not be explored in this Article,266 the Court reversed itself and
upheld minimum wage legislation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.67
From this point onwards, the Court rejected the Lochner-ian reading
of the Due Process Clause and began to regularly uphold regulations
in the economic field. In the words of Nowak and Rotunda, "[t]he
Parrish opinion marked the beginning of the end for judicial scrutiny
of economic legislation under the concept of substantive due
process. ' 8  Several cases decided during the Lochner years were
overruled in the 1940's. As the Court put it in Lincoln Federal Union v.
Northwestern Iron, the "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional
doctrine, 269 had been abandoned:
This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was
decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in
the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned
199 U.S. 306, 318 (1905) (holding an ordinance which granted the exclusive privilege to handle
waste and garbage to one plant to be valid). It has been argued that in the Lochner-era cases in
which the police power was said to extend to health, safety, morals, and welfare, "welfare" was
understood by the Court as physical, rather than economic or social. 9 BRITANNICA
(MICROPAEDIA), supra note 136, at 559.
.. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 185-86 (1919).
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Nebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
20 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1361.
For analysis of the Lochner-era's demise, see, for example, STONE ET AL., supra note 5, at
761, and the OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 924 (Kermit
L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
M 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 418.
29 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
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closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid
federal law.1
7 °
This entailed an expansion of the police power. Now it was clear that
general welfare, including economic and social interests, was within
its permissible scope. In the words of a 1952 decision, "the police
power is not confined to a narrow category; it extends.., to all the
great public needs."27' As was authoritatively stated in a publication
prepared by the United States Congress, "[s]tates have an inherent
'police power' to promote public safety, health, morals, public
convenience, and general prosperity .... ,,27 Furthermore, "[t] his
power is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive,
disorderly, or unsanitary.
'"27 3
Thus, from the initially broad definition of police power as state
sovereignty, the courts moved to a narrow notion that restricted its
scope to the promotion of public health, safety, and morals. This was
followed by a return to a broad conception, although somewhat
different from the old one, by which the police power encompasses
all that is for the public welfare. The three definitions remain in
American constitutional law, but when the courts today use the
narrower definitions and make reference to the acknowledged ends
of the police power ("public health, safety, morals, welfare") they do
so not, as in the Lochner era, to limit the scope of the state's authority,
but rather to provide non-exhaustive examples of the goods that the
police power may promote.
2 74
CONCLUSION
My purpose in this Article has been to trace the historical origins
and development of the term "police power" in American
constitutional law, and the inquiry has followed a chronological
order. In summarizing the historical development, it is instructive to
proceed in reverse order, starting with the term's contemporary use
and working back from there.
V0 Id. at 536.
27' Day-Brite v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952) (upholding a conviction under a Missouri
statute forbidding employers from docking the wages of employees who have absented them-
selves in order to vote).
2172 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 248, at 1681.
211 Id. at 1681 n.48.
274 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (listing the
traditional exercises of police power).
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Nowadays, insofar as the expression is used in American
constitutional law, the phrase "police power" normally refers to the
authority of the states for the promotion of public health, public
safety, public morals, and public welfare. But this has not always been
the case. With the rise of the Lochner era at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the police power was narrowly construed to
encompass only the promotion of public health, safety, and morals 27 5:
economic regulation was in principle taken not to be within the
police power during this period. After the demise of Lochner in276
1937, economic interests were recognised to be clearly within the
legitimate scope of the police power, under the label of either public
welfare or public prosperity, and this remains the case today.
Alongside this substantive definition of the police power there
remains a broader one of older pedigree. The phrase was coined by
Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland2 77 to convey the idea of
the residuary sovereignty of the states: the great mass of powers not
delegated by the states to the federal government and thus retained
by them; a residuum which is obtained "after taking away from the
general powers of government, first, such powers as the convention of
1787 found it necessary to bestow upon the general government, and,
second, such other powers ordinarily regarded as sovereign as had
already acquired distinct recognition, particularly (so far as
concerns the states) eminent domain, taxation, and administration of
justice.2 79 This idea was reiterated in subsequent decisions and was
most clearly articulated in Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court
in the License Cases.28s As recently as 1995, the majority of the Court
has deployed this idea of the police power in United States v. Lopez,28'
which clearly suggests the debate surrounding the police power is of
far more than merely historic or academic interest.
The broad conception of the police power has roots in the earlier
notion of police which appeared in decisions preceding Brown v.2812- • •• ,
Maryland. More importantly, "internal police," or "internal polity,"
was a principal category of early American constitutional and pre-
constitutional discourse. As has been obvious all along, the term had
2'5 This narrowing of the police power had been announced in earlier decisions such as
Muglerv. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See supra notes 241-45.
72' See supra notes 267-71.
M 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
27' NOVAK, supra note 90, at 405.
279 See supra text accompanying note 234. This idea was foreshadowed by the conceptualiza-
tion of police. See supra text accompanying note 96.
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); see supra text accompanying note 235.
' 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see supra notes 193-95.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1824) (contrast-
ing laws of police with laws of commerce); supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
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a meaning far removed from our present understanding of the police
as the forces dedicated to upholding public order and suppressing
crime. It was the name for the whole range of legislative power not
delegated to the federal government and thus retained by the states.
Moreover, before the Constitution was sanctioned, the First
Continental Congress had laid claim for each of the separate colonies
to "an exclusive power of legislation... in all cases of taxation and
internal polity."283 In effect, in that congress of 1774, the expression
was used several times to contrast the internal police of the colonies
from the powers of Great Britain.284
The Americans imported this concept of police from European
political theory and practice. The writings of Blackstone and Vattel
on police were especially influential in the incipient United States. In
his Commentaries, Blackstone designated a particular category of
crimes as "offenses against the public police." These included
vagrancy, luxury, gambling, and common nuisance, among others.
Instances of common nuisance included disorderly inns and ale
houses, lotteries, and offensive trades and manufactures.
Blackstone's notion of offenses against the public police
foreshadowed American constitutional law's narrow, substantive
conception of the police power. The Commentaries also dealt with
police-using it here as a synonym of oeconomics-in the context of
the prerogative of the king. Here, police was related to the
regulation of commerce and the establishment of weights and
measures. This economic meaning of police is also present in Vattel,
who affirmed the authority of the sovereign to make 'regulations of
police' in order to limit the use of private property. By and large,
Vattel tied his definition of police-or polity, as the French term
"police" was sometimes translated-to regulations prescribing
"whatever will best contribute to the public safety, utility and
convenience.
The eighteenth-century notion of police is difficult to understand
as it encompasses a wide variety of things and is an end of
government embracing several objects that do not fit well under the
other ends of government, namely justice, international relations,
taxation, and eminent domain. It operates as a residuary and
miscellaneous legal category. Perhaps its main characteristic is that
when police is at stake, the impact on the public domain is such that
it cannot be adequately captured by the language of individual
rights.
286
211 JOURNALS, supra note 155, at 68 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
25 1 VATTEL, supra note 52, bk. 1, ch. XIII, § 174, at 76-77.
2% See supra text accompanying note 97.
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Both Blackstone and Vattel advanced their thoughts on police in
the context of the formative analogy between king (and kingdom)
and father (and family). It is precisely because the king is like a
paterfamilias that he ought to take care of police, the well-ordered
pursuit of the common good of the kingdom. Blackstone's and
Vattel's mild patriarchalism had antecedents in Sir Robert Filmer's
Patriarcha, the first strong version of moral patriarchal theory.287
The eighteenth century also witnessed the development of the
idea of police in Scotland, where it appeared as a heading of
miscellaneous regulations and, like in Blackstone's Commentaries, as a
class of crimes, namely "offenses against the police. ''2 M
This Article has shown the dependence of a key notion of
American constitutional law-the police power-on an important
eighteenth-century idea: police. The term "police" began as an
obscure element of the incipient constitutional arrangements of
several jurisdictions, including Scotland, England, and the United
States. It eventually served as the basis for the articulation of the
concept of police power, a concept that for many years was a
cornerstone of American constitutional law and that still remains part
of that law, despite clear indications that it is at the heart of various
tensions, outlined in the Introduction. Determining the future
developments of the police power is a task for another occasion. But
it is my hope that by delving into the historical background of the
police power, this Article will have thrown some light on this often
misunderstood legal concept.
See supra Section III.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-36.
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